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HOAGLAND v. HOAGLAND 
Appellee's Brief 
Case No- 920340-CA 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The jurisdiction is proper before this Court under the 
provisions of Section 78-2a-3(2) (a), Utah Code Annotated. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. It was not an abuse of discretion for the Trial Court to set 
the amount of the alimony based upon the parties standard of 
living prior to separation. 
II. It was not an abuse of discretion for the Trial Court to 
declare the home, currently titled in the Appellant's name, as 
marital property to be divided. 
III. It was not an abuse of discretion for the Trial Court to deny 
Appellant an award of attorney's fees. 
IV. The Trial Court did not err in denying judgment interest on 
payments to Appellant upon a judgment for temporary alimony 
awarded to her prior to the trial herein. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Joy A. Hoagland (hereinafter "Appellant/Plaintiff") filed an 
action for divorce against her husband, Colin G. Hoagland 
(hereinafter "Appellee/Defendant") on August 28, 1989. Record, p. 
001. This case was tried before the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, 
District Court Judge, on the 28th day of October, 1991. 
Transcript, p. 1. The Court took the matter under advisement and 
issued its Memorandum Decision on the 7th day of November, 1991. 
R. p. 272. Thereafter, counsel for Appellee prepared the initial 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as well as the Decree of 
Divorce. R_^  p. 293. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
and the Decree of Divorce, were entered with the Court on the 4th 
day of December, 1991. R^ pp. 293, 303. Appellant filed her 
Objection to Entry of Findings of Fact on December 12, 1991, R^ p. 
307, leading to the eventual filing of the Amended Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, R_^  p. 335, and Second Amended Findings of 
Fact. R^ p. 355. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Appellant/Plaintiff, Joy A. Hoagland and Appellee/Defendant, 
Colin C. Hoagland were married in Elko, Nevada, September 5, 1973. 
Tr. pp. 7, 115. At the time of their marriage the Appellee worked 
for Smith's as a manager for one of their stores. Tr. pp. 26, 60. 
Appellant, a divorced woman with four minor children to support and 
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who had had trouble getting child support payments from her ex-
husband, also worked at Smith's where she worked as a backup 
bookeeper. Tr. pp. 42, 67, 68. Appellant's Exhibit No, 15 Four 
months after their marriage, the Appellee was promoted to District 
manager for Smith's and was responsible for stores in Salt Lake, 
Orem, and Provo. Tr, pp. 20, 117. Appellee loved the Appellant's 
children and substantially supported them financially during the 
entire time that the parties were married. R^ p. 356. No child 
was born of this marriage. R^ p. 356. 
When the parties were married they first lived in a house at 
240 West 4800 South in Ogden, Utah, which had been awarded to 
Appellant from her previous divorce. Tr, pp. 12. After three 
years of marriage, the parties decided to purchase a new home at 
151 West 5400 South, Washington Terrace, Utah. The home purchase 
closed in June of 1976. Tr. p. 14. The parties resided there 
until December of 1986 when Appellee was forced to move to Nevada 
in order to obtain work. Tr. pp. 8, 167. Both Appellant and 
Appellee considered both homes as "our" home, as indicated by 
testimony. Tr. pp. 12-13, 124. 
In 1978, the Appellee quit working for Smith's as district 
manager and a partnership was formed to run a grocery business. 
Tr. p. 117. There were four partners: the Appellee, the 
Appellant, the Appellee's brother, and the Appellant's son. Tr. p. 
27. A store was purchased and the name was changed to Hoagie's 
Freeway Market. Tr. p. 117. At first, the businesses were very 
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successful and gradually totalled three stores. Tr. p. 123. The 
Appellee consistently worked at one of the businesses as a manager, 
the Appellant at first worked full time as a cashier, later as a 
bookkeeper, and after a short time worked only on a part time 
basis. Tr. p. 43. By 1984 however, the stores were beginning to 
run in the negative and by 1985 they were very heavy in the 
negative. Tr. p. 154. 
In 1986, a creditor of the partnership, Utah Bank and Trust, 
in Salt Lake City, approached the Appellee and wanted a lien on the 
marital residence for the bank. However, the Appellee refused the 
bank a lien. Tr. p. 122. The Appellee, by that time realized that 
the partnership would probably be forced into Bankruptcy, and 
decided to take action in order to save as much of the marital 
assets that had been accumulated by the parties as possible. 
Thereafter, the partnership was converted into two (2) 
corporations, in May of 1986. Tr. p. 121. Also, in May of 1986 
the Appellee executed a Quit-Claim Deed to the marital residence to 
the Appellant in furtherance of the parties' efforts to protect the 
marital estate. Tr. p. 121. Both parties understood that the sole 
reason for the Quit-Claim Deed was to protect the marital residence 
from the claims of creditors of the family business. Tr. p. 156. 
The transfer of title to the Appellant was in no way intended by 
the parties to deny the Appellee his rights to the marital estate. 
Appellee's intention was to keep the Appellant and himself out of 
personal bankruptcy. Tr. pp. 120, 155. The corporations filed 
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bankruptcy in November of 1986. Tr. pp. 73, 88. 
The day before bankruptcy was filed Appellee and his brother 
brought home cash that was on hand at the businesses and the money 
was divided. The share received by the Appellee and the Appellant 
was approximately $8,000.00 to $10,000.00. R^ 358, Tr^ pp. 18, 
140. The Appellee handed the money to the Appellant and never saw 
any of the money again. R. p. 358, Tr. p. 140. When the Appellee 
accepted employment in December 1986, in Las Vegas, Appellant 
retained all of the marital assets, including the $8,000.00 to 
$10,000.00 cash, two automobiles, a motor home, all of the home 
furniture, furnishings, and the four bedroom home with swimming 
pool. R_^  p. 358. In contrast, when Appellee left for Las Vegas, 
he took with him $300.00, together with a pickup truck that was 
encumbered, and a motorcycle. R^ pp.357-358. 
After the Bankruptcy Creditors Hearing, Appellee looked for a 
job and eventually received an offer in the Ogden area as a 
stocker/freight unloader for Harmon's, earning $7.00 per hour. Tr. 
p. 162. Thereafter, Appellee was offered a job by Smith's in 
either Tucson, Arizona or Las Vegas, Nevada. Tr. p. 162. Appellee 
accepted the job with Smith's and on December 28, 1986 he packed up 
and moved to Las Vegas, Nevada. R. p. 356, Tr. p. 16. Appellee 
began working for Smith's in Las Vegas in January of 1987. R^ p. 
357. 
Appellee saved his money from his job in Las Vegas in order to 
purchase a house in Henderson, Nevada for he and the Appellant. 
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Tr. p. 187. In March of 1987, the Appellant visited the Appellee 
in Las Vegas. Appellee showed Appellant the new house on which he 
had already made a $2,500.00 down payment. Tr. pp. 79, 170. The 
Appellee informed the Appellant that the mortgage loan was already 
approved and the only thing needed was for her to sign the papers. 
Tr. p. 158. Appellant refused to move to Las Vegas and stated, "We 
have a house in Ogden." Tr. pp. 79, 80, 81, 157. The Appellant 
thereafter abandoned the Appellee and it became clear to Appellee 
that there could be no hope for the marriage. The parties were 
permanently separated after Appellant's March, 1987 visit to 
Appellee. Agreement was thereafter reached between the parties 
whereby, Appellant agreed to forego alimony in exchange for 
Appellee giving Appellant all of the marital assets. Tr. pp. 185, 
186, R^ p. 358. Appellee lived by the agreement, and, in 
addition, voluntarily sent Appellant money for Appellant's mortgage 
payments on the marital residence until he was served in September 
of 1989 with a divorce complaint in Reno, Nevada, where he had been 
transferred. Appellee then realized that Appellant had violated 
their agreement and was seeking alimony, and all of the marital 
assets as well. R^ p. 358, Tr. pp. 185-186. 
Subsequent to the separation of the parties, Appellee was 
promoted by Smith's to store manager in May of 1987. Tr. p. 127. 
Later, he was transferred to Reno by Smith's and then transferred 
again to Phoenix, Arizona. R^ p. 359. In January, of 1991, the 
Appellee was forced to change his employment from store manager to 
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buyer for Smith's because of his rheumatoid arthritis. R^ p. 360, 
Tr. p. 128. Meanwhile, Appellant lived off the money that the 
Appellee had left with her. Tr. p. 20, appellant's Exhibit No. 6. 
When the money ran out, Appellant got a job working as a cashier in 
a grocery store. Tr. p. 43. In 1989, Appellant was hired by the 
Internal Revenue Service as a seasonal employee and is presently 
employed by the IRS. Tr. p. 44. 
It was not until after Appellee had experienced some success 
in his employment with Smith's, that the Appellant decided to 
renege on the parties' agreement and she filed for a divorce on 
August 28, 1989, seeking not only all the marital estate, but also 
alimony of $1,500.00 per month in addition to the income from her 
job. Tr. pp. 59, 60. That month the Appellee was served in Reno, 
Nevada with a Summons and a Complaint and with an Order to Show 
Cause for Temporary Support. R. 1-10 Tr. 5-10. The Appellee filed 
an answer to the Complaint. R_^  p. 27. A Hearing was held on the 
Order to Show Cause for Temporary Support. R_^  p. 11. The Appellee 
was unable to attend because of his work in Nevada. 1R^  p. 358. 
However, Appellee did file an Objection to the Request for 
Temporary Alimony, but no action was ever taken on his objection to 
the Order. R. p. 275. Temporary alimony was awarded to the 
Appellant in the amount of $1,500.00 a month. R. p. 275, 359. 
At the time of the trial, the Appellee was found to be 
$27,507.00 in arrears. R_^  p. 359. However, Appellee contends that 
he was not given credit for the amounts of money paid to Appellant# 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. IT WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO SET 
THE AMOUNT OF THE ALIMONY BASED UPON THE PARTIES' STANDARD OF 
LIVING PRIOR TO SEPARATION. 
Utah precedents dictate that three factors must be considered 
by the Trial Court when it awards alimony, and that there must be 
a clear abuse of discretion for the Trial Court's award to be 
overruled. The determination of the standard of living is very 
fact sensitive and the Trial has the discretion to consider various 
factors, besides the three factors to determine the standard of 
living that is most equitable given the specific facts of the case. 
The award of alimony to Appellant should be upheld because the 
facts support the Court's decision. 
II. IT WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO 
DECLARE THE HOME, CURRENTLY TITLED IN THE APPELLANT'S NAME, AS 
MARITAL PROPERTY TO BE DIVIDED. 
Credibility of witnesses is in the Trial Court's discretion. 
The Trial Court correctly believed the Appellee and found the Quit-
Claim Deed was executed solely to protect the family home from the 
Business Creditors. A Utah case, Hogue, demonstrates that a home 
may be found a marital asset even where one spouse has quit-claimed 
all rights to the other spouse. The Doctrine of Judicial and Quasi 
Estoppel is not applicable here because Appellee did not disclaim 
his interest in the home in the corporate bankruptcy, and because 
Appellant did not raise these theories in the Trial so she is 
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barred from raising them on appeal. Regardless, the State of Title 
is not binding on the Trial Court and it has discretion to 
distribute marital property as the Court finds equitable. 
III. IT WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO DENY 
APPELLANT AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
The Trial Court's findings are adequate. In the alternative, 
the Trial Court's analysis was sound based upon the evidence set 
forth in the record. In addition, Appellant did not present 
sufficient evidence of her financial need, to justify any change in 
the decision of the Trial Court. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING JUDGMENT INTEREST ON 
PAYMENTS TO PLAINTIFF UPON A JUDGMENT FOR TEMPORARY ALIMONY AWARDED 
TO HER PRIOR TO THE TRIAL HEREIN. 
The "judgment" for temporary alimony referred to by Appellant 
is not a final judgment for purposes of Section 15-1-4 of the Utah 
Code. Further, neither temporary nor permanent alimony are 
governed by Section 30-3-10.6 of the Utah Code. Interest should 
not be awarded on past due temporary alimony payments before the 
divorce decree is entered. 
-9-
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ARGUMENT 
1. IT WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO SET 
THE AMOUNT OF ALIMONY BASED UPON THE PARTIES' STANDARD OF LIVING 
PRIOR TO SEPARATION. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "The most important 
function of alimony is to provide support for the wife as nearly as 
possible at the standard of living she enjoyed during marriage, and 
to prevent the wife from becoming a public charge." English v. 
English, 565 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977). The Court goes on to state 
that three factors must be considered in fixing a reasonable 
alimony award: 1. The financial conditions and needs of the wife. 
2. The ability of the wife to produce a sufficient income for 
herself. 3. The ability of the husband to provide support. See, 
Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985). In Paffel v. 
Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986), the Supreme Court stated, 
"This Court will not interfere with the Trial Court's award of such 
support in a divorce proceeding absent showing of a clear and 
prejudicial abuse of discretion." The Court further states that 
the failure to consider the three factors as listed in English, 
constitutes an abuse of discretion. These three factors were 
considered by the Trial Court along with other relevant facts and 
support the Court's award of alimony, therefore, this Court should 
uphold the Trial Court's award of alimony. 
From a recent case it becomes evident that the Court did not 
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abuse its discretion regardless of how the standard of living was 
determined. In Whitehead v. Whitehead,, 193 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 10 
(Utah App. 1992), the Court found that where Mrs. Whitehead's 
monthly living expenses were "unsubstantiated," it was not an abuse 
of the Trial Court's discretion to deny alimony. Here, the Trial 
Court labeled Appellants' Affidavit of Monthly Living Expenses a 
"wish list" and adds that it "reflects a desire on the part of the 
Plaintiff to obtain high alimony rather than reasonably advising 
the Court of the Plaintiff's actual expenses." R^ p. 361. Besides 
the discrepancies discussed by the Court, Appellant denied she ever 
spent close to the requested $60.00 per month clothing expense, but 
stated, "This is what I should spend." Tr. p. 106. Under the 
Whitehead holding, the Appellant could be denied any alimony 
because she did not provide the Court with an accurate account of 
her expenses and failed to prove the first of the three factors. 
A Trial Court is not obligated to award alimony in divorce 
actions, even where there is considerable difference between the 
parties' income. In Burt v. Burt, 799 P. 2d 1166, 1170 (Utah App. 
1990), the Court stated: 
"While equity should be the watchword as the trial court 
apportions property and calculates alimony payments, See 
Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P. 2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1987), 
alimony may not be automatically awarded whenever there is 
disparity between the parties income." 
In Newmeyer, 745 P.2d at 1297, the Supreme Court upheld the Trial 
Court's award of one dollar per year alimony to Mrs. 
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Newmeyer. The Court stated that although Mrs. Newmeyer had a 
relatively poor ability to earn income sufficient to maintain as 
nearly as possible the standard of living that the parties enjoyed 
when married, worked at the time of divorce, but only 
"episodically' and at low paying jobs during the marriage and her 
prospect for future earnings were not as great as Mr. Newmeyer's, 
Mrs. Newmeyer had received a majority of the marital assets. The 
facts stated by the Court match those in this Ccise where Appellant 
received not only one-half interest in the marital home, but all 
the other marital assets the parties had accumulated. R^_ p. 358, 
362. 
The Trial Court's denial of alimony was upheld by the Supreme 
Court in another case. In Walker v. Walker, 707 P. 2d 110, 113 
(Utah 1985), the Court found that the wife had not shown a unique 
need and even though her annual income of $11,000.00 was only about 
half of the husband's annual income it was in the Trial Court's 
discretion to deny the wife alimony. Walker would also support the 
Trial Court's decision even if the Trial Court had completely 
denied alimony to the Appellant. 
Another factor which is determinative in this case is the 
agreement made between the parties in which the Appellant agreed to 
forego alimony in exchange for all marital assets. R_^  p. 358. In 
Huck v. Huck, 734 P. 2d 417, 419 (Utah 1986), the Supreme Court 
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states that the agreements of the parties are not binding on the 
Court, but serve "as a recommendation". The Court stated in Nunley 
v. Nunley, 737 P. 2d 473, 475 (Utah App. 1988), that agreements 
between the parties should be "respected and given considerable 
weight in the Court's determination of an equitable division." 
Citing Clausen v. Clausen, 675 P. 2d 562, 564 (Utah 1983). 
Therefore, the Trial Court had the discretion to follow the terms 
of the agreement and deny Appellant any alimony. Equally within 
the Court's discretion, it divided the marital assets and awarded 
alimony, which allows Appellant to enjoy a standard of living 
similar to that she enjoyed during the marriage. 
Other statements made by the Supreme Court support the Trial 
Court's decision. In English, 565 P.2d at 412 the Court states: 
"This court ruled the trial court may properly consider a 
husband's historical earning ability, when he has experienced 
a temporary decrease in income, when determining the amount he 
should contribute for the support and maintenance of his 
family. This principle should be equally applicable, when the 
husband's experience prospers during one year." 
The purpose of using historical earnings is to prevent a 
spouse from taking advantage of temporary circumstances in the 
determination of alimony. From the facts it could be observed by 
the Court that the Appellant is an opportunist trying to cash-in on 
the Appellees' post-separation financial success. 
Financial contributions made by each of the parties to their 
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joint financial success is a valid factor to influence the Trial 
Court's award of alimony. English, 565 P.2d at 412. Here, the 
Appellee not only substantially supported the parties, but also the 
Appellant's four minor children from her first unsuccessful 
marriage. R^_ p. 356. Similarly, it was the Appellee who financed 
the purchase of the 1978 Delta motor home that Appellant sold for 
$9,000.00. Appellant's Exhibit 7. Appellee also left the $8,000.00 
- $10,000.00 with Appellant when he moved to Nevada, and sent the 
Appellant $15,500.00 for mortgage payments before the Appellant 
filed for divorce and contributed a total of $25,337.00 to 
Appellant between December, 1986 and the trial. R. p. 358, Tr. p. 
100, 176. These facts support the Trial Court's decision. 
The Court found the Appellant in good health, with no 
disabilities, R^ p. 360. However, she only works as a seasonal 
employee of the Internal Revenue Service. Appellant went to great 
lengths to give a detailed account of her work history and her 
"persistent" struggle to obtain full time employment. Tr. pp. 48-
57, 104. Appellant Exhibits 15, 23-30. Her age is offered as the 
excuse for her inability to obtain full-time employment. However, 
the Appellant did not attribute her failure to her lack of 
education or training, which is the one action Appellant blatantly 
refuses to do. Tr. pp. 84-85. The Appellee testified and the 
Appellant acknowledges that the Defendant offered to pay tuition 
and to financially support Appellant for several years so that she 
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could get the education or training needed to become a self 
supporting person. Tr. pp. 103, 159. 
In Reed v. Reed, 594 P. 2d 871, 872 (Utah 1979) citing Wilson 
v. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P. 2d 977 (Utah 1956), it states: 
"The court may, and as a practical matter invariably does, 
consider the relative loyalty or disloyalty of the parties to 
their marriage vows, or the relative guilt or innocence in 
causing the breaking of the marriage." 
Findings of the Court demonstrate that the Court rightly 
believed that the Appellee did desire and intend for the Appellant 
to move to Nevada and for the marriage to continue. R^ p. 362. On 
the other-hand, Appellant abandoned the Appellee when he needed her 
the most. The grocery business had failed, and Appellee was forced 
to move to another state and live in much less comfortable 
circumstances than he enjoyed in Ogden, in order to obtain 
employment to support the family. His ego shattered, his life a 
mess, Appellant poured salt into his wounds by her refusal to move 
to Nevada to be with the Appellee, stating the house he had in 
Nevada did not compare with the home in Ogden. Tr. p. 80, 161. 
Under these circumstances, the Trial Court had discretion to 
favorably treat the Appellee. 
According to Howell v. Howell, 806 P. 2d 1209, 1211 (Utah App. 
1991), a case upon which the Appellant so heavily relies, this 
Court stated, "due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the 
trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. Utah R. 
Civ. P. 52(a): Jense v. Jense, 784 P.2d 1249, 1251 (Utah Ct. App. 
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1989)." The preponderance of the evidence in this case supports 
the Court's apparent credibility judgement in favor of the 
Appellee. Consequently, the Court has the discretion to make 
decisions which reflect its credibility judgement and favorably 
treat the Appellees in the Court's subsequent decisions. 
Appellant seems to believe that Howell is directly on point 
with this case. This is an erroneous application of Howell. In 
contrast to the Howell case, there were no children born of this 
marriage which Appellant stayed home to raise. Even if it was only 
part-time, the Appellant did work throughout most of the marriage, 
while Mrs. Howell did not work. Also, the time between separation 
and the divorce filing and the Divorce Decree is twice as long in 
this case than in Howell. 
The most important difference between the two cases deals with 
employment of the husbands. Mr. Howell never changed his job. He 
was a pilot for Western Airlines which was taken over by Delta 
Airlines. As a consequence of the takeover, Mr. Howell's income 
doubled. Howell 806 P.2d at 1210. This Court found that his 
salary increase was a type of "deferred income", even though as the 
dissent states, there was no commitment from Western that Mr. 
Howell's income "would increase if and because he stayed with the 
airline." _Id. at 1215, n.2. But there is no way that the 
Appellee's income can be considered deferred income. Appellee 
worked for Smith's, quit to start a family business which failed, 
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then worked for Smith's again. Appellant's contention that 
Appellee's financial success was due to the experience of owning 
his own stores is ludicrous. Appellee was a store manager for 
Smith's before the parties married and was promoted to district 
manager only four months after the marriage. Tr. p. 117. The 
Appellant testifies that during the time the parties owned their 
own grocery business, Smith's repeatedly visited the store and 
tried to convince Appellee to resume employment with Smith's. Tr, 
p. 83. Finally, when Appellee did return to work for Smith's he 
was not made a store manager immediately. Tr. p. 127. His post-
separation financial success was found by the Court to be a result 
of his efforts after the separation. R_^  p. 274. 
When the Court held that the facts of Howell required a 
determination of standard of living at the time of Trial rather 
than at the time of separation, this Court wisely stated: 
"In so concluding we do not intend to establish a rigid rule 
which must be followed in all domestic cases, but acknowledge 
that trial courts have discretion to determine the standard of 
living which existed during the marriage after consideration 
of all relevant facts and equitable principles." 
Howell 806 P.2d at 1212 
The principle applied in Howell is very fact specific and this 
Court did not mention or apply Howell to two subsequent cases. 
Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P. 2d 73, 76 (Utah App. 1991); Roberts v. 
Roberts, 188 Utah Adv. Rep. 26, 28 (Utah App. 1992). (No case was 
found where Howell was followed) 
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Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P. 2d 1076 (Utah 1988) is 
referred to by Appellant to show that alimony should try to 
"equalize the parties respective standard of living enjoyed during 
the marriage." Here again it is important to note the requirement 
"enjoyed during the marriage." The Court also stated that Mrs. 
Gardner had not worked for almost thirty years, and had actually 
enjoyed the benefits of Mr. Gardner's $6,000.00 per month salary. 
Also, the Court mentioned that the amount of alimony awarded by the 
Trial Court was not sufficient to meet the needs of the monthly 
expenses listed on an affidavit executed by Mrs. Gardner prior to 
trial. _Id. at 1081. All this drastically contrasts to the facts 
of this case. 
As the Trial Court accurately found, the Appellant did not 
enjoy a high standard of living. R^ p. 360. The Court found that 
previous to the parties' business bankruptcy and separation, 
Appellant's take home pay was $500.00 per week. R_^  p. 360. The 
exhibits admitted by both parties show that the average annual 
income for the years 1983 to 1986 was $2,701.74. If 1987 income is 
included, the annual average is increased to $8,513.19. 
Appellant's Exhibit No. 17, 18, Appellee's Exhibits No. 15, 16, 
17. Appellant's current income of $9,780.00 or more is $1,266.81 
more than the parties averaged from 1983 to 1987. With alimony and 
her own income, Appellant will have an annual income of about 
$22,000.00, "which is almost equal to that which the parties were 
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living on when the Defendant was drawing $500.00 per week from his 
business prior to separation of the parties, and represents a 
monthly amount greater than the amounts set out in the Affidavit of 
monthly expenses as filed by the Plaintiff." R^ p. 364. 
Two more cases are presented by the Appellant in an attempt to 
show that alimony should be set to maintain "a standard of living 
not unduly disproportionate to that which they would have enjoyed 
had the marriage continued." Savage v. Savage, 658 P. 2d 1201, 
1205 (Utah 1983), see also Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 P. 2d 1144, 1147 
(Utah App. 1988). It is worth noting that the Court in both cases 
stated in the opinions that alimony should maintain the standard of 
living "enjoyed during the marriage." Savage, 658 P.2d at 1205; 
Naranjo 751 P.2d at 1146, 1147. (Emphasis added) Even so, these 
two cases can be factually differentiated from this case to show 
that "had the marriage continued" theory is inapplicable here. 
In Savage, the husband had continued employment with the same 
company throughout the marriage and divorce. Savage 658 P.2d at 
1202. The wife remained a full-time homemaker and caretaker for 
the parties' three children. _Id. at 1203. Additionally, the Court 
found Mrs. Savage had enjoyed a high standard of living during the 
marriage and that the alimony awarded by the Trial Court was just 
barely over one-half of Mrs. Savage's monthly expenses. Id. at 
1205. In Naranjo, the wife had been a full-time homemaker for the 
sixteen years prior to the divorce while the husband had developed 
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a successful trucking business. Naranjo 751 P.2d at 1147. 
Despite the wording of these two cases, the Trial Court did 
not abuse its discretion in the amount of alimony awarded in this 
case. In Howell 806 P.2d at 1212, this Court stated that a Court 
"can properly address what situation would have existed if the 
parties had not separated earlier." Appellant testified that the 
only way the separation would not have occurred is if Appellee had 
remained in Ogden. Tr. p. 82. Appellee did not receive a job 
offer from Smith's to work in Utah. Tr. p. 162. The only job 
offer Appellee received in the Ogden area was a job as freight 
unloader/stocker with Harmon's earning seven dollars an hour. Tr. 
p. 162. The standard of living that the Appellant would have 
enjoyed if the separation had not occurred earlicsr, or if there was 
no divorce, would be a very minimal standard of living, which 
standard the Appellant surpasses with her current income plus the 
alimony awarded by the Trial Court. 
Judicial economy does not necessarily require that the Court 
use the standard of living of the parties at the time of the trial 
to determine the amount of alimony. When the Trial Court awards 
alimony, it is presented with all the facts relevant to the case, 
including the standard of living actually enjoyed by the parties 
before the separation of the parties and the standard of living 
they enjoyed at the time of trial. Any material change in 
circumstances prior to the divorce will be considered and included 
-20-
HOAGLAND v. HOAGLAND Case No. 920349-CA 
Appellee's Brief 
in the Court's decision, and any future changes in the alimony 
award will be because the Trial Court abused its discretion, not 
simply becuase of a pretrial material change of circumstances. 
Consequently, judicial economy is achieved regardless of which 
standard of living is used. 
Cases have been cited by Appellant to show that the value of 
marital assets be determined at the time of trial. Berger v. 
Berger, 713 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah 1985); See also Fletcher v. 
Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1980). The implication is that the 
standard of living must also be determined at the time of trial. 
However, this Court points out in Howell, 806 P.2d at 1211, the 
"courts can, however, in the exercise of their equitable powers, 
use a different date, such as the date of separation, if one party 
has 'acted obstructively, f" citing Peck v.Peck, 738 P.2d 1050, 
1052 (Utah App. 1987). The Trial Court has the discretion to 
equitably determine the value of marital property, as well as the 
standard of living at the time of separation. The facts in this 
case support the Trial Court's equitable determination that the 
applicable standard of living was that which the parties enjoyed at 
the time of their separation. Appellant did not meet the burden of 
proof to show the findings were "clearly erroneous." Riche v. 
Riche, 784 P.2d 465, 468 (Utah App. 1989); citing Matter of Estate 
of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Walker, 
743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). 
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II. IT WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO 
DECLARE THE HOME, CURRENTLY TITLED IN THE APPELLANT'S NAME, AS 
MARITAL PROPERTY TO BE DIVIDED. 
The general rule is that "property acquired after {Marriage} 
is marital property*" Walters v. Walters, 812 P. 2d 64, 68 (Utah 
App. 1991). In the distribution of property in a divorce, the 
trial court has "wide discretion", Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P. 2d 
1218, 1222 (Utaft 1980), and its decisions will not be disturbed 
unless it is clearly unjust or a clear abuse of discretion. Gardner 
v. Gardner, 748 P. 2d 1076, 1078 (Utah 1988). Appellant has the 
burden to show arror. Berger v.Berger, 713 P. 2d 695, 697 (Utah 
1985). 
The Trial Court properly found the family residence to be a 
marital asset, and the Appellant's interest in the partnership was 
found to have no equity. R_^  p. 361. Although, Appellant denies 
any knowledge of this fact, in view of all the stress due to the 
bankruptcy it is "highly unlikely" that Appellant didn"t know. 
Secondly, the Quit-Claim Deed, the incorporation, and the corporate 
bankruptcy all occurred in a short period of time. Another fact 
which supports the Court's decision is that the $8000 - $10,000 
received and kept by Appellant as a share of the stores' cash on-
hand at the time of the corporation bankruptcy was given to both 
Appellant and Appellee. R^ p. 358. Appellant testified that the 
money was to "be split between Colin and I, for us together". Tr. 
p. 18. Perhaps the most convincing evidence to the Trial Court's 
decision comes from the Appellant herself. In recounting a 
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discussion between the parties which occurred after the Quit Claim 
Deed was executed, the Appellant repeatedly states, in her 
testimony, "We have a house in Ogden." Tr. pp 79, 80, 81. 
Obviously, Appellant considered the home to be a marital asset. 
A case which has many similarities to the case at hand is 
Hogue v. Hogue, 184 Utah Adv. Rep 63 (Utah App. 1992). In Hogue, 
Mr. Hogue purchased a ranch with his own money after his divorce 
from Mrs. Hogue. Later Mr. Hogue conveyed, by Quit-Claim Deed, 
sole ownership of the ranch to Mrs. Hogue. The next month Mr. and 
Mrs. Hogue were remarried. The second divorce decree, which was 
upheld by the Appellate Court, declared the ranch to be a marital 
asset, Id, at 64. 
Appellant would have this Court believe that the court in 
Hogue was correct when it found the ranch was marital property, but 
then argues it would be an abuse of discretion to find the home, 
marital property, in this case. The argument of Appellant is 
without merit. The general rule that property acquired during a 
marriage is marital property applies to this case, since the home 
was purchased while the parties were married. It is inapplicable to 
Hogue, however, because the ranch was purchased by Mr. Hogue while 
he was single; between his two marriages to Mrs. Hogue. Equally 
illogical, is Appellant's assertion that the Quit-Claim signed by 
Mr. Hogue has less validity than the Quit-Claim Deed signed by 
Appellee. If one Quit-Claim Deed has more validity than the other, 
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then Mr. Hogue's quit-claim deed would be more valid. Mr. Hogue 
purchased the ranch while he was single, had sole ownership of the 
property, and had not yet remarried Mrs. Hogue when he executed the 
Quit-Claim Deed to her. Whereas, in this case, the parties 
purchased the home during the marriage, had joint ownership of the 
home, and Appellee executed the quit claim deed to his spouse, the 
Appellant. 
When a Trial Court must distribute property in a divorce a 
factor that affects the Courts' decision is the credibility of the 
witnesses. Howell 806 P.2d at 1211. In addition to the issues 
previously discussed regarding the credibility of the Appellant's 
testimony, a few other discrepencies in her testimony may have 
influenced the Courts' decisions. First, Appellant emphatically 
denies that the Quit-claim Deed was signed to protect the home from 
the business creditors' claims, yet she readily admits that the 
title to the Lincoln automobile was signed over to Appellant's 
daughter for that very reason, Tr. pp. 86 & 88. Appellant admits 
that it was a smart thing to do. Tr. p 88. Another example is 
Appellant's statement that Appellee said at the time of conveyance 
that he wanted out of "her" house. Tr. pp. 32, 87. But Appellee 
stayed in "her" house for another seven months and moved out only 
because he was forced to move to Las Vegas, Nevada in order to get 
a decent job. Tr. pp. 162, 83. Appellant claims that she was a 
partner in the grocery business and that Appellee executed the 
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Quit- Claim Deed in exchange for her interest in the partnership. 
Tr. pp. 28, 32, 87. Yet, when asked who were partners in the 
business, Appellant omits herself as a partner. Tr. p. 26, 27. 
Lastly, the Appellant stated that the bankruptcy was "from our 
business" (emphasis added), not Appellee's business. Tr. p. 19. 
As previously discussed, loyalty or disloyalty of the parties 
to the marriage may properly be considered by the Trial Court. 
Reed, 594 P.2d at 872. This principle is equally or even more 
applicable to the distribution of marital property than it is to 
the determination of alimony. Appellant should not be rewarded by 
receiving sole ownership in the family residence when it is 
Appellant that cruelly abandoned Appellee. 
Judicial, or Quasi Estoppel, is not applicable to this case. 
The bankruptcy filed in November, 1986 was a corporate bankruptcy. 
Since Appellee refused to sign the lien as requested by the Utah 
Bank and Trust, Tr. p. 122, there was no claim by the corporation's 
creditors against the marital residence so Appellee did not have to 
disclaim his interest in the house. Furthermore, there was no 
attempt by any creditor to set aside the corporate identity as a 
"sham", so the personal assets of the parties were never a part of 
the bankruptcy. Tr. p. 123. Consequently, the Appellee never 
obtained any relief in a previous action by disclaiming his 
interest in the home so the Appellant's claim of Judicial or Quasi 
Estoppel is totally without merit. These circumstances do not in 
-25-
HOAGLAND v. HOAGLAND Case No. 920340-CA 
Appellee's Brief 
any way undermine the Trial Courts' position that the Quit-Claim 
Deed was solely for the purpose of protecting the marital residence 
from the claims of business creditors. The parties fears of the 
impending bankruptcy and the possibility of an attempt to pierce 
the corporate veil were real and it was logical and reasonable for 
the parties to put as much distance, as possible, between the 
business creditors and the parties ownership of the marital 
residence. These circumstances, the potential bankruptcy, explains 
why Appellant was never made an officer or director of the 
corporation, and also why she was requested not to come to work at 
the business for several weeks before the bankruptcy was filed. 
Tr. p. 120. 
Even if Appellee had actually disclaimed any interest in the 
marital residence in the corporation's bankruptcy, which he did 
not, there are defenses to Appellant's argument of Judicial and 
Quasi Estoppel. In Hogue, Mr. Hogue filed for bankruptcy under 
Chapter 7 and claimed no interest in the ranch. This occurred 
three years after the Quit-Claim Deed to Mrs. Hogue. Hogue, p. 64. 
Neither the Trial Court nor the Appellate Court had a problem with 
Judicial and Quasi Estoppel and declared the ranch marital 
property. If these doctrines were not applicable in Hogue they are 
even less applicable here, because in this case the bankruptcy was 
corporate not personal, as in Hogue. 
Another valid defense exists to Appellant's claim of Judicial 
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or Quasi Estoppel. There is a well established rule in Utah that 
"an appellant cannot raise a theory on appeal for the first time 
different from that presented to trial court." First Equity Corp. 
of Florida v. Utah State Univ., 544 P. 2nd 887 (Utah 1975); see 
also Ream v. Fitzen, 581 P. 2d 145 (Utah 1978); Bullock v. Joe 
Bailey Auction Co., 580 P. 2d 225, (Utah 1978); Hanover Ltd. v. 
Fields, 568 P. 2d 751 (Utah 1977); Nelson v. Newman, 583 P. 2d 601 
(Utah 1978). Nowhere in the pleadings of record, or in the trial 
transcript did the Appellant assert the theory of Judicial or Quasi 
Estoppel. Therefore, Appellant is barred from asserting these 
theories on appeal. Failure of the Court to address this theory 
was not an abuse of the Court's discretion since it was not the 
responsibility of the Court to argue Appellant's case. 
Finally, if the Court had found the Quit-claim deed valid and 
that Appellant had sole ownership of the home, the Trial Court 
still has the discretion to declare the home marital property. If 
Appellant did receive sole ownership of the family residence it was 
during the marriage and under the general rule the family residence 
would be considered marital property. There are ample Utah 
precedents that state that even when a party brings separate 
property into a marriage it may be declared marital property if the 
other spouse has, through his or her own, "contributed to the 
enhancement, maintenance, or protection of that property, thereby 
acquiring an equitable interest in it." Osguthorpe v. Osguthorpe 
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804 P.2d 530, 535 (Utah App. 1990); citing Mortensen v. Mortensen, 
760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988); Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1169 
(Utah App. 1990); Dubois v. Dubois, 29 Utah 2d 75, 504 P.2d 1380, 
1381 (Utah 1973). State of title is not binding on the Court when 
it determines what property is part of the marital estate. Smith 
v. Smith, 738 P.2d 655, 657 (Utah App. 1987); Huck: v. Huck, 734 P. 
2d 417, 420 (Utah 1986); Workman v. Workman, 652 P. 2d 931, 933 
(Utah 1982); Jackson v. Jackson, 617 P. 2d 338, 340-41 (Utah 
1980). The overriding consideration of the disposition of the 
marital assets is that it is fair and equitable. Newmeyer 745 P.2d 
at 1278. Equity demands that the residence be held by the court to 
be a marital asset. 
III. IT WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO DENY 
APPELLANT AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
Section 30-3-3 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, allows 
a trial court to award attorney fees in divorce proceedings. On 
the question of attorney's fees, the Utah Court of Appeals has 
stated: "If either financial need or resonableness has not been 
shown, we have reversed awards of attorney's fees." Haumont v. 
Haumont 793 P.2d 421, 426 (Utah App. 1990). "Where insufficient 
evidence is presented on the reasonableness of the requested 
attorney's fees or the financial need of the receiving spouse, no 
fees are awarded." Hagen v. Hagen, 810 P.2d 478, 484 (Utah App. 
1991). Ordinarily, when fees in a divorce were awarded below to 
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the party who then prevailed on appeal, fees will also be awarded 
to that party on appeal. Conversely, when they were not awarded 
below, we will not generally award them on appeal, except when a 
party has presented a well-supported claim of changed 
circumstances." Burt v. Burt, 799 P. 2d 1166, 1171 (Utah App. 
1990). 
The award of attorney's fees must be based upon three factors: 
"One, evidence of financial need of the receiving spouse; Two, the 
ability of the other spouse to pay; and Three, the reasonableness 
of requested fees." Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P. 2d 1331, 1337 (Utah 
App. 1988). Appellant contends that the Trial Court's findings are 
inadequate and that financial need exists on the part of the 
Appellant. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS ARE ADEQUATE. 
The Trial Court did make adequate findings. The findings are 
found in the Second Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
dated May 7, 1992. Regarding Appellant's contention that the Trial 
Court's findings in this case are inadequate, this Court has 
stated: 
"A footnote in a recent Utah Supreme Court Case suggests that, 
where there are no findings, or where the findings are 
inadequate, the general rule requires us to affirm whenever it 
would be reasonable to find facts to support a given 
conclusion. State v. Ramirez 817 P. 2d 774, 787, n. 6, (Utah 
1991) Rule 52(c) permits findings and conclusions to be 
waived under certain circumstances except in divorce actions, 
lending further support for the requirement that findings must 
be made by the trial court in a divorce action if we were 
to infer findings where there are none, as suggested by 
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Ramirez, it would be only reasonable to place the burden on 
the one challenging the implied findings and the resulting 
conclusion to marshal1 the evidence in support of such 
findings and to show how the evidence, viewed in the light 
most favorable to the trial court, is nevertheless 
insufficient to support the implied findings. Doelle v. 
Bradley, 784 P. 2d 1176, 1178 (Utah 1989). Without this 
requirement, the burden on the appellate courts to go through 
volumes of transcripts and exhibits in search of evidence 
supporting the implied findings would be prohibitive. It 
would also place the reviewing court in the untenable position 
of second guessing the trial court's reasons for finding as it 
did without the advantage of observing witnesses first hand 
and assessing their credibility." Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 
73, 76 (Utah App. 1991). 
The footnote in Rudman would indicate that the Appellant in 
this case needed to marshal the evidence in support of the findings 
and to show how the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to 
the Trial Court, is nevertheless insufficient to support the 
findings and conclusions of law rendered by the Trial Court. 
Rudman is not the only divorce case which holds that the Appellant 
must marshal the evidence: 
"However, Husband does not fmarshal1 the evidence in support 
of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this 
evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support 
as to be "against the clear weight of the evidence, ' thus 
making them "clearly erroneous.'" Riche vr Riche, 784 P.2d 
465, 468 (Utah App. 1989). 
In spite of the requirement to marshal the evidence, Appellant 
has only argued the facts favorable to her case, while ignoring the 
Trial Court's findings, similar to the following case: 
[Plaintiff] "has not even attempted to marshall the evidence 
in support of the trial court's findings, nor has she 
attempted to demonstrate that the trial court's findings are 
against the clear weight of the evidence, as required by 
Walker. Instead, she has essentially reargued the factual 
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case submitted below, construing all evidence in a light most 
favorable to her case and largely ignoring the evidence 
supportive of the trial court's findings. This leads us to 
rely heavily on the presumption of correctness that attends 
these findings under Rule 52(a)." Matter of Estate of 
Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989) 
B. IN ANY EVENT, THE TRIAL COURT'S ANALYSIS WAS SOUND, 
BASED ON THE EVIDENCE SET FORTH IN THE RECORD. 
The evidence as found by the Trial Court included the amounts 
of money that Appellant would have at her disposal in order to pay 
her attorney's fees, which are: the seasonal employment with the 
Internal Revenue Service including unemployment compensation at 
over $9,780.00 per year; $400.00 per month in alimony, plus 
$600.00 per month against the substantial arrearage in alimony 
amounting to $27,507.00; $9,000.00 from the sale of the motor home 
by Appellant; $8,000.00 or $9,000.00 in cash left by the Appellee 
for the benefit of Appellant; the first $19,672.00 from the sale of 
the marital house valued at $85,000.00 to $97,000.00; one half of 
the balance of the proceeds from the sale of the parties' residence 
representing another $35,000.00 plus to Appellant; and essentially 
all of the other marital assets. The evidence clearly establishes 
that Appellant has no financial need for assistance in paying her 
attorney's fees. To the contrary, the evidence shows that 
Appellant has the financial resources to pay her attorney's fees. 
And it is fair and equitable that she do so. 
The Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals have held 
in two separate cases that the Trial Court record disclosed 
sufficient evidence regarding financial need: 
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"Evidence of defendant's need for assistance in paying her 
attorney fees unfolded during the entire trial, so a special 
proceeding specifically concerned with determination of her 
need is not necessary. The Utah Supreme Court similarly 
concluded in Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P. 2d 1276, 1279 (Utah 
1987), stating: "because ample evidence of [the wife's] 
financial condition was before the court we reject [the 
husband's] argument that the trial court's finding of need was 
unsupported by the evidence.'" Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365, 
368 (Utah App. 1988) 
"Plaintiff also contends that the district court erred in not 
ordering defendant to pay her attorney's fees, and she 
requests attorney's fees for the purposes of this appeal. An 
award of attorney's fees is largely discretionary with the 
court, and as the record shows that plaintiff is working and 
earning money, and does not disclose any necessity on the part 
of plaintiff for such award, or her inability to pay her own 
attorney's fees, we do not find any abuse of the court's 
discretion in its denial of such fees. Attorney's fees on 
appeal are denied for the same reason." Adams v. Adams, 593 
P. 2d 147, 149 (Utah 1979). 
In this case Appellant is working and earning money from her 
seasonal employment with the Internal Revenue Service. When she is 
not working with the I.R.S., she receives unemployment 
compensation, all of which totals in excess of $9,780.00 per year. 
The findings in the Trial Court, as found by the* Honorable Ronald 
0. Hyde District Judge, indicated that her list of monthly expenses 
reflected a desire on her part to obtain high alimony rather than 
reasonably advising the court as to her actual needs. If, as the 
Appellant contends, the Trial Court's findings are deficient 
because they fail to evaluate the Appellant's financial need, it is 
reasonable to conclude that the Trial Court found that Appellant 
did not have any financial need for an award for attorney's fees to 
be paid. This Court emphasized the need for specific findings: 
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"We therefore remand the issue of fees for specific findings 
regarding the financial needs for Mrs. Rudman. In the event 
the court on remand determines that need exists, the court 
should then make findings as to the reasonableness of .... the 
attorney fees." Rudman, 812 P. 2d 73, at 77. (emphasis 
added). 
The Trial Court did make specific findings regarding 
Appellant's financial need, which are discussed below. 
It would seem reasonable that the Trial Court determined that 
Appellant's financial condition did not require that her attorney's 
fees be paid by the Appellee. If the Trial Court had made a 
finding that need existed, then the Trial Court would have made 
findings regarding the reasonableness of her attorney's fees. 
C. APPELLANT/PLAINTIFF HAS NOT PRESENTED SUFFICIENT 
EVIDENCE OF HER FINANCIAL NEED. 
Factor Two in the awarding of attorney's fees is the ability 
of the other spouse to pay. The Trial Court analyzed and 
considered Appellee's ability to pay Appellant's attorney's fees 
and found that after the bankruptcies, the Appellee reobtained 
employment with Smith's and became a store manager, but he later 
developed rheumatoid arthritis and had to down grade his job to 
that of a buyer. 
Regarding Factor One, evidence of financial need of the 
receiving spouse, the Trial Court found that the Appellee had left 
in the possession of the Appellant approximately $8,000.00 to 
$10,000.00 in cash and the motor home of the parties, which at a 
later time the Appellant sold for $9,000.00 cash, which she also 
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retained entirely. The Appellee also left with the Appellant all 
of the house furnishings, furniture, the house and lot with 
swimming pool, a 1980 Lincoln Town Car, and a 1976 Chevrolet, of 
which she has had sole control and use since December of 1986. The 
Court also found that none of the $8,000.00 to $10,000.00 cash or 
the $9,000.00 received by the Appellant from sale of the motor home 
was shared by Appellant with the Appellee. 
The Trial Court also found that Appellant is currently 
employed as she has been for some time, with the United States 
Treasury Department, Internal Revenue Service, as a GS-5 step 1, 
with a part time gross pay of $8,280.00 plus unemployment for ten 
weeks giving her a total gross yearly income of $9,780.00. In 
addition, the Court found that Appellant 
testified that she would receive an increased income from her 
employment in 1992. The Court also found that Appellant's health 
is good and she suffers no disabilities. 
Furthermore, the Trial Court found: 
"that Plaintiff [Appellant] filed an Affidavit of Monthly 
Expenses showing present monthly expenses of $1796.00 per 
month; however, Plaintiff's claims, of her expenses, is more 
a "wish list than a needs list'. 
An example of that fact is that her transportation expense 
list shows $531.00 for transportation expense though her 
testimony is that she drives very little. She also indicates 
that her personal expenses of $270.00 per month includes 
recreation and travel of over $130.00, and she testified that 
she does not travel and that she spends very little money on 
recreation. In addition, she recites that her personal food 
expenses totaled $350.00 per month which is not a realistic 
sum to spend for one person, and reflects a desire on the part 
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of the Plaintiff to obtain high alimony rather than reasonably 
advising the Court of the Plaintiff's actual expenses." 
See Finding No. 23 in the Second Amended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, by Ronald 0. Hyde, Judge, dated May 7, 1992. 
The Trial Court, in its Conclusions of Law stated that the 
house and lot should be sold, and that from the net sale proceeds 
the Appellant should be awarded the first $19,672.00 without 
interest, representing Appellant's equity from her prior home, 
prior to the marriage of the parties, and the balance of the 
remaining equity should be divided, one-half to the Appellant, and 
one-half to the Appellee. The house and lot had been appraised 
twice for $97,000.00 and $85,000.00. The Court also concluded that 
there was delinquent alimony owed to the Appellant in the sum of 
$27,507.00, that the Appellant should be awarded ongoing alimony, 
and that the Appellee should pay to the Appellant the sum of 
$600.00 per month in liquidation of the delinquent alimony sum of 
$27,507.00 which the Court calculated will take 45.845 months and 
that the Appellee should not be required to pay interest on the 
delinquent alimony. The Court also concluded that neither party 
had much retirement benefits accumulated, but each should have an 
interest in the other's retirement per the Woodward v. Woodward 
formula. Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982) 
In addition, the Court concluded: 
"The Plaintiff [Appellant] in receiving $12,000.00 a year for 
3.8 years from the Defendant, plus her current earnings on a 
part time basis of $9,780.00, or more, will provide Plaintiff 
with a gross income of almost $22,000.00 per year which is 
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almost equal to the income both parties were living on when 
the Defendant was drawing $500.00 per week from his business 
prior to the separation of the parties, and represents a 
monthly amount greater than the amounts set out in the 
Affidavit of Monthly Expenses as filed by the Plaintiff. 
Therefore, the Plaintiff and the Defendant should each pay 
their own attorney's fees and costs." See Conclusion of Law 
No. 14, Second Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, dated May 7, 1992. 
It is apparent that the Trial Court considered that the 
Appellant's financial need was in question. The Trial Court Judge 
stated in his Memorandum Decision and in the Second Amended 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, that the Appellant's 
Affidavit of Monthly Expenses was made more "with the view to 
obtain high alimony than to advising the Court of her actual 
expenses." It seems reasonable to conclude that the Trial Court 
thought that Appellant had inflated claimed expenses to indicate a 
financial need greater than existed, or perhaps where none existed. 
The Appellant in this case has adequate resources to pay her 
attorney's fees as found by the Trial Court. The findings 
adequately show that Appellant has no financial need for an award 
of attorney's fees and that both parties are able to pay for their 
own attorney's fees: 
"Wife requests attorney fees at trial and on appeal. Attorney 
fee determinations at trial lie within the trial court's sound 
discretion. Munns v. Munns 790 P. 2d 116, 123 (Utah App. 
1990). Consequently, we will not disturb the court's finding 
that "both parties are capable of paying the same, because we 
find no abuse of discretion.'" Roberts v. Roberts, 188 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 26, at 29 (Utah App. 1992). 
In a 1990 case, this Court held that a substantial judgment 
for arrearages in alimony could be used to satisfy payment of 
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attorney's fees. The Trial Court heard evidence on need and chose 
not to award the wife attorney's fees and costs. In its opinion 
the Utah Court of Appeals stated the following: 
"Wife does not challenge the court's denial of attorney's fees 
below nor does she assert on appeal any facts in addition to 
those presented to the trial court concerning her financial 
need. She does not claim her situation has deteriorated since 
the trial....furthermore, the wife was awarded a substantial 
judgment for arrearages in alimony which could be used to 
satisfy her fees." Bagshaw v. Bagshaw, 788 P.2d 1057, 1062 
(Utah App. 1990). 
As in Bagshaw, this Appellant has received a substantial 
judgment for arrearages in alimony which could be used to satisfy 
her attorney's fees. It is reasonable to conclude that the trial 
Court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the 
Appellant has adequate financial resources to pay her attorney's 
fees. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING JUDGMENT INTEREST ON 
PAYMENTS TO APPELLANT UPON A JUDGMENT FOR TEMPORARY ALIMONY AWARDED 
TO HER PRIOR TO THE TRIAL HEREIN. 
Argument I. THE "JUDGMENT" REFERRED TO BY APPELLANT IS NOT 
A FINAL JUDGMENT FOR PURPOSES OF SECTION 15-1-4 
OF THE UTAH CODE. 
A. THE "JUDGMENT" FOR TEMPORARY ALIMONY AS REFERRED TO 
BY APPELLANT, IS ENTITLED "RECOMMENDED ORDER ON ORDER 
TO SHOW CAUSE AND ORDER" DATED MAY, 1991 AND IS NOT 
A FINAL JUDGMENT. IT IS AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER. 
Appellant contends that past due alimony in the amount of 
$21,935.00 was reduced to "judgment" at a hearing held in May in 
1991. The hearing regarding the past due temporary alimony was 
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held on April 30, 1991 before the Honorable Maurice Richards, 
domestic relations commissioner, who presented recommendations to 
the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, District Judge. Those 
recommendations were embodied in a "Recommended Order on Order to 
Show Cause and Order." Appellee (Defendant) asserts that the Order 
entitled "Recommended Order on Order to Show Cause and Order" is 
not a final judgment for purposes of appeal. Appellee asserts that 
the Order is interlocutory, which means that it is not a final 
decision of the whole controversy; it merely determines one point 
in the cause of action, and only decides some intervening matter 
pertaining to the cause, which requires some further steps to be 
taken in order to enable the Court to adjudicate the entire cause 
of action on the merits. An order is not a final judgment when 
claims and issues remain pending in the trial court: 
"For purposes of appeal, * final judgment' is one which ends 
litigation and leaves no claim remaining for resolution." 
Tippets v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 738 P. 2d 635 (Utah 1987). 
In this case, the "Recommended Order on Order to Show Cause 
and Order" was an interlocutory order and is not a final judgment 
because the divorce decree had not been executed or entered by the 
Trial Court. The Order is not a final judgment because claims 
regarding other divorce issues were pending in the Trial Court. 
The "Recommended Order on Order to Show Cause and Order," for 
temporary alimony, referred to by Appellant as a judgment, is not 
a final judgment but is an interlocutory order. 
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B. IN ANY EVENT, WHETHER SAID ORDER IS INTERLOCUTORY OR 
IS A FINAL JUDGMENT, APPELLANT DID NOT COMPLY WITH 
THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND THE UTAH RULES 
OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE. 
Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states: 
(a) "judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree and 
any order from which an appeal lies. A judgment need not 
contain a recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the 
record of prior proceedings, (b) When more then one claim for 
relief is presented in an action, .... the court may direct 
the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than 
all of the claims or parties only upon an expressed 
determination by the court that there is no just reason for 
delay and upon an expressed direction for the entry of 
judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, 
any order or other form of decision, however designated, which 
adjudicates fewer than all the claims or all the rights and 
liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate 
the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order 
or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject 
to revision at any time before the entry of judgment 
adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of 
all the parties." Utah R. Civ. P. 54. 
In this case the "Recommended Order on Order to Show Cause and 
Order" did not have an express determination by the Court that 
there was no just reason for delay and did not have an express 
direction for the entry of judgment. As such, the "Recommended 
Order on Order to Show Cause and Order" is not a final judgment for 
purposes of Rule 54. 
Rule 58A(c) and (d) state: 
11A judgment is complete and shall be deemed entered for all 
purposes, ....when the same is signed and filed as herein 
above provided. The clerk shall immediately make a notation 
of the judgment in the Register of Actions and the Judgment 
Docket. The prevailing party shall promptly give notice of 
the signing or entry of the judgment to all other parties and 
shall provide proof of service of such notice with the clerk 
of the court " Utah R. Civ. P. 58A. 
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If the Appellant considered the "Recommended Order on Order to 
Show Cause and Order" as a final judgment, Appellant did not have 
the clerk make a notation of the judgment in the Register of 
Actions and the Judgment Docket. Neither did the Appellant 
promptly give notice of the signing or entry of judgment to other 
parties and file proof of service of such notice with the clerk of 
the court. 
The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 4(a) states: 
"In a case in which an appeal is permitted as a matter of 
right from the trial court to the appellate court, the notice 
of appeal required by rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of 
the trial court within 30 days after the date of entry of the 
judgment or order appealed from." 
Rule 5(a): "An appeal from an interlocutory order may be 
sought by any party by filing a petition for permission to 
appeal the interlocutory order with the clerk of the appellate 
court with jurisdiction over the case within 20 days after the 
entry of the order of the trial court, with proof of service 
on all other parties to the action." Utah R. App. P. 4,5. 
If Appellant considered the "Recommended Order on Order to 
Show Cause and Order" to be a judgment or an interlocutory order, 
on which right of appeal did exist, Appellant did not file the 
proper notice of appeal within the required number of days. For 
judicial economy and to save time, Appellant has appealed this 
particular "Order" with her appeal of the divorce decree. It is 
reasonable to conclude that Appellant did not consider the "Order" 
as a final judgment and waited to appeal the "Recommended Order on 
Order to Show Cause and Order" until the Memorandum Decision and 
Decree of Divorce were executed and entered by the Trial Court. 
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Therefore, the "Recommended Order on Order to Show Cause and Order" 
is not a final judgment. 
"The final judgment rule, which underlies what is now Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure 3, precludes a party from taking 
an Appeal from any orders or judgments that are not final. 
However, there are exceptions to the final judgment rule when 
the order in question is eligible for certification under Utah 
Rule of Civil Procedure, 54(b) and has been properly certified 
or when we have given permission in advance to the parties to 
take an appeal from an interlocutory order under Utah Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 5. [Citations omitted]. Here, because the 
order appealed from was not final and was not certified nor 
eligible for certification under Rule 54(b), it was not 
properly taken." A.J. Mackay Co. v. Okland Const. Co., 817 P. 
2d 323, 325 (Utah 1991). 
The "Recommended Order on Order to Show Cause and Order" is 
not a final judgment, according to the Utah Rules of Appellate 
procedure. Appellant neither certified the "Order" nor received 
permission to appeal the "Order". As stated in Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 54, this particular Order was not a final Order at 
the time it was rendered. The Order was not final for the simple 
reason that other claims and issues in the case were pending before 
the Trial Court. Therefore, the "judgment" received in May of 1991 
was merged into the divorce decree. 
C. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SAID ORDER WAS IMPROPERLY 
EXECUTED AND IS THEREFORE, DEFECTIVE. 
The "Recommended Order on Order to Show Cause and Order" may 
not be considered a final judgment because it is defective. As 
stated above, the hearing was held on April 30th, 1991, and the 
recommendations were signed by the Domestic Relations Commissioner 
on May 20, 1991. A Notice attached to the Order indicates that the 
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Appellee had ten days from May 9, 1991 to file any written 
objections and the document was dated and mailed May 10, 1991. Ten 
days from that date would be the 19th or 20th of May, 1991. 
However, there is also the Order itself which states: 
"That ten days having expired since the date of hearing, 
defendant [appellee] failed to file any objections, it is 
hereby ordered that said recommendations be and are hereby 
approved and ordered." 
Ten days from the date of hearing would be May 10, 1991. But 
the Order was signed by Ronald 0. Hyde, District Court Judge on May 
8, 1991. The "Recommended Order on Order to Show Cause and Order" 
was filed on May 28, and entered May 29, 1991. It is obvious that 
since the Judge signed the Order on May 8, and ten days for the 
Notice expires on May 19 or May 20, of 1991, and ten days from 
hearing expires on May 10, 1991, that the Order is defective. 
During the time that the appeal was in process, Appellee's 
Counsel made a call to the clerk of the Second District Court 
inquiring about exhibits and also inquiring about dates on this 
particular Order. Appellee's Counsel was informed that the 
signature of the Judge was May 8, of 1991. When the Pleadings were 
received by this office in September, 1992, it was apparent that 
someone had altered the date on the Order attached to the 
"Recommended Order on Order to Show Cause and Order". A "2" had 
been inserted in front of the "8" on the dateline of the Order, 
making the date of the Order to appear to be May 28, 1991. A copy 
of the altered Order is included with this brief. 
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Argument II. ALIMONY IS NOT GOVERNED BY SECTION 30-3-10.6 OF 
THE UTAH CODE. 
Section 30-3-10.6 of the Utah Code Annotated reads: 
"(1) each payment or installment of child or spousal support 
under any child support order as defined by subsection 62A-11-
401(3) is, on and after the date it is due: 
(a) A judgment with the same attributes and effect of any 
judgment of a district court, .... 
(b) Entitled, as a judgment, to full faith and credit in 
this and in any other jurisdiction; ...." Section 30-3-
10.6 Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. 
Section 62A-11-401 of the Utah Code defines what "child 
support order" means: 
"(3) "Child Support Order1 means a judgment, decree, or order 
of a court or administrative body whether interlocutory or 
final, whether or not prospectively or retroactively 
modifiable, whether incidental to a proceeding for a divorce, 
judicial or legal separation, separate maintenance, paternity, 
guardianship, civil protection, or otherwise, which: 
(a) establishes or modifies child support; 
(b) reduces child support arrearages to judgment; or 
(c) establishes child support or confirms a child support 
order under Chapter 31, Title 77." Section 62A-11-401, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended. 
Section 30-3-10.6 refers to child support or spousal support 
under any child support order, as defined by Section 62A-11-401 of 
the Utah Code. Alimony is not governed by Section 30-3-10.6, as 
the Appellant contends. Appellant argues that Whitehead v. 
Whitehead, 193 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (Utah App. 1992), requires that 
interest must be awarded on temporary alimony arrearages. But the 
Appellant misreads Whitehead, because only child and spousal 
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support payments are governed by section 30-3-10.6 which is defined 
by subsection 62A-11-401(3). Alimony itself is covered in another 
section of the Whitehead opinion. The Court does not connect child 
and spousal support payments with alimony in the opinion. 
Appellant also cites Stroud v. Stroud 738 P.2d 649 (Utah 
1987), aff'd 758 P.2d 905 (Utah 1988), as a case to show that 
interest should be allowed on temporary alimony granted before the 
divorce decree. In the Stroud case, plaintiff, Karen Stroud, 
asked the Court to issue an Order to Show Cause why judgment should 
not be entered against the defendant for past due child support* 
Plaintiff, Karen Stroud and Defendant James Stroud were divorced on 
June 20, 1972. The decree had ordered defendant to pay child 
support of $75.00 per child per month. On September 20, 1983, the 
Trial Court issued an Order to Show Cause why judgment should not 
be entered against defendant for past due child support. The Trial 
Court found in favor of the plaintiff and ordered defendant to pay 
her $18,815.00 in principle and interest plus attorney's fees and 
court costs, with interest on the unpaid balance to accrue at 12% 
per annum until paid. Defendant asked the court to prohibit the 
accrual of interest on the unpaid judgment provided he remained 
current on his payments. However the Court could not waive the 
interest on the judgment. 
Appellant in the instant case, compares the Stroud case with 
the facts herein before the Court to claim interest on temporary 
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alimony to be awarded before the divorce decree and to be governed 
by a child support order statute. This is clearly not the law. 
Appellant is urging this court to award pre-judgment interest 
on alimony arrearages which occurred before the trial date, and 
before the divorce decree was entered. Section 30-3-10.6 is not 
applicable to alimony, but only child and spousal support payments 
under a child support order. 
Argument III. INTEREST SHOULD NOT BE AWARDED ON PAST DUE 
TEMPORARY ALIMONY PAYMENTS BEFORE THE DIVORCE 
DECREE IS ENTERED. 
There is persuasive law which states that interest should not 
be awarded on temporary alimony ordered before the divorce decree 
is entered. 
In Dube v. Dube, plaintiff attempted to revive a temporary 
alimony order granted 3 years before the final divorce decree was 
filed. The Court ruled that the temporary order was not a final 
judgment capable of being revived and stated: 
"Temporary alimony or support is also referred to as alimony 
pendente lite interim alimony, or interlocutory alimony and 
sis an allowance by the court for the maintenance of a spouse 
during pendency of a matrimonial action. [Kansas law] allows 
a court to award maintenance pendente lite .... an award of 
temporary maintenance lies within the discretion of the Court. 
The amount is subject to modification as the circumstances 
change. In any event, the temporary maintenance ceases when 
the divorce action terminates.? In Edwards v. Edwards, 182 
Kan. 737, 324 P. 2d 150 (1958), the court said: san allowance 
of support...pendente lite does not become a final judgment on 
which execution can issue, but is merely a temporary or ad 
interim provision for their support until the final 
determination of the action ' 
When addressing the issue of past due installments of 
temporary support, however, the court in Edwards said: "The 
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rule that past due installments for child support [or 
permanent alimony] ordered paid by the final decree become 
final judgments as of the dates due and may be collected in 
the same manner as other judgments, is clearly inapplicable to 
past due installments of support allowed pendente lite.' 
Further the court said: 'An order allowing temporary alimony 
is not in the nature of a final judgment on which execution 
can issue, nor is it a decree in equity for the payment of 
money. No vested rights are acquired in the amount allowed. 
Like other interlocutory orders, an order for support money 
pendente lite remain solely in the sound judicial discretion 
of the court which made it and may be modified as varying 
circumstances justify during the time the action is pending in 
any form in the district court, even to the extent of 
discharging accrued and unpaid installments. 
The past due installments .... did not become final 
judgments.... which could be collected by execution.... those 
installments, when due, were subject to enforcement by 
attachment.... or by contempt proceedings." Dube v. Dube, 809 
P. 2d 1245r 1248 (Kan. App. 1991) See Edwards v. Edwards, 324 
P.2d 150 (Kan. 1958) cited as a footnote in Eskelson v. 
Eskelson, 528 P.2d 1186 (Utah 1974) (emphasis added) 
The Court in Dube also pointed out: 
11
 "A temporary alimony award pending the final judgment in the 
lower court is merged in the judgment and does not continue 
after the judgment." Dube, 809 P.2d at 1248. quoting Rankin 
v. Rankin, 275 So.2d 283, 284 (Fla. Dist. App. 1973). 
The Dube case is persuasive and would indicate that the 
temporary alimony ordered in the instant case should not be 
considered as a final judgment, that it merged into the divorce 
decree entered December 4, 1991, and that interest on the temporary 
arrearages should not be awarded. Awarding of such interest must 
be kept discretionary with the Trial Court: 
"Given the highly discretionary nature of property division 
cases, we hold that a trial court may award pre-judgment interest 
in divorce proceedings. It is not required, however, and interest 
should not be awarded where it "would do an injustice. ' The trial 
court should consider the facts of each particular case. A party 
in a divorce proceeding is not "entitled' to such interest in every 
case, because the trial court must have broad discretion to 
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determine the most equitable distribution of marital property under 
the particular circumstances." Morris v. Morris, 724 P.2d 527, 
530, (Alaska 1986). 
Appellee respectfully urges this Court to not award interest 
on the temporary alimony which was ordered to be paid to the 
Appellant by the Appellee. Appellant filed for a divorce in Utah 
and served the Appellee in Nevada. Appellant obtained a temporary 
order of $1500.00 per month alimony, but Appellee filed a written 
objection to the request for temporary alimony. Appellee did not 
attend the hearing because he did not want to jeopardize his 
employment, but no action was ever taken on his written objection 
to the order. During the trial Appellee testified that he paid 
$25,337.00 to the Appellant, which included amounts paid to her 
since the separation and garnishment. Tr. p. 176. By the time of 
trial, however, Appellant claimed delinquent temporary alimony 
amounted to the sum of $27,507.00. 
In its findings, the Trial Court found that Appellee owed 
Appellant the full $27,507.00 in delinquent alimony and that the 
Appellant should be awarded ongoing alimony. In its Conclusions of 
Law, the Court stated that the Appellee should pay to the Appellant 
the sum of $400.00 per month ongoing alimony, and the sum of 
$600.00 per month in liquidation of the delinquent alimony sum of 
$27,507.00, which the Court calculated would take 45.845 months, 
and that the Appellee should not be required to pay interest on the 
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delinquent alimony. In any event, the past due alimony has been 
merged into and included in the final divorce decree. It is 
reasonable to conclude that based on its findings, the Trial Court 
concluded that requiring interest on the temporary alimony 
arrearage would be unfair and inequitable as to the Appellee. 
The Trial Court denied interest based on the following 
grounds: 
The motion of the Plaintiff that she be awarded interest 
on the Plaintiff's Judgment for delinquent alimony that has 
been awarded Plaintiff by the Court should be and hereby is 
denied, it appearing that any delay in the performance of the 
terms of the Decree of Divorce with rsespect to payment of 
past due alimony to the Plaintiff, by the Defendant, will be 
caused, if at all, solely by the Appeal of this case by the 
Plaintiff. 
See Order, executed by Ronald 0. Hyde, District Judge on 
February 25, 1992. 
Appellee urges this court that awarding interest on the 
temporary alimony arrearages will not only increase the burden of 
Appellee in paying the arrearages and the ongoing alimony, but will 
also affect future divorce cases where interest on temporary 
alimony payments may be considered. In its effort to find equity 
to the parties, the Trial Court is given discretion as to whether 
interest should be assessed. Divorce is extremely difficult, both 
financially, and emotionally, on both parties in the divorce case. 
CONCLUSION 
A Trial Court's decision will not be disturbed unless the 
facts, viewed in a light most favorable to the Trial Court's 
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decision, demonstrate a clear abuse of discretion. Utah case law 
and the specific facts of this case would support a total denial of 
alimony to Appellant, and certainly support the alimony awarded by 
the Trial Court. 
The Trial Court has the discretion to determine the standard 
of living at the time of separation, if the facts of the case 
demonstrate that is fair and equitable. Several of the reasons the 
Trial Court was justified in the award of alimony: Appellant's 
unsustantiated monthly living expenses, the agreement between the 
parties, Appellant's obvious credibility problem, and the 
Appellant's abandonment of Appellee. 
The Quit-Claim Deed was executed by the Appellee to protect 
the marital residence from the parties' business creditors and not 
to buy the Appellant's worthless interest in the partnership. 
Regardless, the Court is not bound by the state of title in the 
distribution of marital assets. The Appellee did not disclaim his 
interest in the marital residence in the corporate bankruptcy, 
therefore, Judical or Quasi Estoppel is not applicable here. 
On the issue of attorney's fees, the Trial Court discussed at 
length its findings regarding Appellant's financial need. 
Appellant has not marshalled the evidence in support of the 
findings to show how that evidence viewed in the light most 
favorable to the Trial Court is nevertheless insufficient to 
support the findings and conclusions of law rendered by the Trial 
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Court. In addition evidence regarding Appellant's financial need 
was adequately set forth in the trial record, including an inflated 
Affidavit of Monthly Expenses labeled by the Trial Court as more a 
"wish list than a needs list." 
The Trial Court did not err in denying interest on temporary 
alimony payments awarded to the Appellant before trial. The 
"judgment" entitled "Recommended Order on Order To Show Cause and 
Order" is not a final judgment, but is an interloclutory order. 
Appellant did not comply with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure or 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. In the alternative, said 
"Order" is defective. Further, Section 30-3-10.6 is not applicable 
to alimony but only child and spousal support payments under a 
child support order. 
Based upon the aforementioned reasons, Appellee respectfully 
prays this court to deny Appellant's appeal and affirm the Trial 
Court's decision. 
Respectfully sumitted this 19th d^y of pctop4p, z. 
DONI^EC CASSITY 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
.V ...a 
•J 
JOY A. HOAGLAND, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
COLIN G. HOAGLAND, 
Defendant. 
RECOMMENDED ORDER ON 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
AND ORDER 
MAY 2 8 1991 
Civil No. 890903214 
JUDGE RONALD 0. HYDE 
The above captioned matter came on regularly for hearing 
on the 30th day of April, 1991, before the Honorable Maurice 
Richards, Domestic Relations Commissioner, upon Plaintiff's Order 
To Show Cause In Re Contempt and Entry of Judgment. Plaintiff was 
present and represented by counsel, Michelle E. Heward on behalf of 
David Bert Havas and Associates, and Defendant was not present nor 
was he represented by counsel. The Commissioner having been fully 
apprised in the circumstances, now makes the following findings: 
1. Plaintiff and Defendant were married on September 6, 
1973, and have lived separate and apart since December 28, 1986. 
2. Defendant in an Order to Show Cause hearing held on 
September 19, 1989, was ordered to pay Plaintiff temporary alimony 
in the amount of Fifteen Hundred Dollars ($1,500.00) per month. 
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3. In addition, Defendant was ordered to pay Plain-
tiff's attorney's fees in the amount of Two Hundred Dollars 
($200.00). 
4. Defendant has paid a total of Eight Thousand Fifty 
Dollars ($8,050.00) alimony from September 1989, to March 1991. 
5. Defendant is in arrears of alimony in the amount of 
Twenty One Thousand One Hundred Fifty Dollars ($21,150.00) for the 
period September 1989 through April, 1991, and attorney's fees in 
the amount of Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00). 
6. Defendant had the ability to pay the alimony 
payments as ordered since he earned in excess of $6,600.00 gross 
per month during the year 1990. 
7. Defendant is in contempt of Court for his failure to 
pay the alimony and attorney's fees as ordered. 
8. Plaintiff has incurred reasonable attorney's fees 
and costs to pursue this matter. 
From the foregoing findings the Commissioner makes the 
following RECOMMENDATIONS: 
1. Plaintiff be awarded a judgment in the amount of 
Twenty One Thousand One Hundred Fifty Dollars ($21,150.00) against 
Defendant for arrearages in alimony for the period September 1989, 
through April 1991, plus interest at the statutory rate of twelve 
percent (12*) per annum. 
HOAGLAND V. HOAGLAND 
Recommendations and Order On 
Order To Show Cause and Order 
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2. Defendant be ordered to pay Plaintiff's attorney's 
fees for this Order to Show Cause in the amount of Five Hundred 
Dollars ($500.00) plus costs of Eighty Five Dollars ($85.00) 
3. Plaintiff be awarded a judgment in the amount of Two 
Hundred Dollars ($200.00) for attorney's fees previously ordered to 
be paid by Defendant. 
4. The total judgment amount to be awarded is Twenty 
One Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Five Dollars ($21,935.00). 
5. It is recommended that Defendant be held in contempt 
of the Court's order for failure to pay alimony in a timely manner. 
That Defendant be ordered to serve five (5) days jail sentence 
unless Defendant purges himself by paying the above judgment within 
ten days from the entry of the Order herein. 
6. That this order become final ten (10) days from the 
date of mailing. 
DATED t his ^ 6 day of May, 1991 
RECOMMENDED AND APPROVED BY: 
HOAGLAND V. HOAGLAND Civil No. 890903214 
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Order To Show Cause and Order ^fY^Hr^i 
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i Inao NOTICE TO DEFENDANT 
TO THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT: 
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that you have ten (10) days 
from the date of May 9, 1991, to file a written objection to the 
above recommendations with the Domestic Relations Clerk, Second 
District Court of Weber County, 6th Floor, Ogden, Utah 84401, 
pursuant to Section 30-3-4.4(3), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as 
amended. Failure to do so will result in the following Order being 
signed by a District Court Judge and the recommendations shall then 
become order of the Court. Govern yourself accordingly. 
DATED this day of May, 1991. 
lEtfARD, No. 5084 o MICHELLE E. H W ,  f 
DAVID BERT HAVAS AND ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Recommended Order on Order To Show Cause to Donn E. 
Cassity of Romney, Nelson & Cassity, 115 Social Hall Avenue, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111; postage prepaid this {(/r^ day of May, 
1991. 
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• 'Lee having been given to the above named Defendant, 
5"- "'ing expired since the date of hearing herein and 
- i"^  ing failed to file any objections to the recommenda-
eir 
1" IS HEREBY ORDERED that said recommendations be and are 
hereby -pproved and ordered. 
L..IED this *13 day of May, 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
JISTRICT C( 
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JOY A. HOAGLAND, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
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Both parties agree this relationship has irreconcilable 
differences. Each of the parties is granted a divorce against 
the other on the grounds that there are irreconcilable 
differences between the parties. The divorce shall become final 
upon signing and entry. 
The problem here is the division of property and question 
of alimony. Plaintiff claims the home was given to her by the 
defendant in exchange for any interest in the business. 
Defendant claim is that the title to the property was placed in 
the plaintiff's name in order to protect it because the business 
was failing. He testified that the banks wanted the home placed 
for additional security and he would not do this. I hold that 
the property was placed in the plaintiff's name to protect it 
from business failure and that the home is a marital asset. The 
Memorandum Decision 
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business did fail and the parties divided up some cash that was 
approximately $10,000.00 as defendant's portion and neither 
plaintiff or defendant made the claim that this belonged to the 
defendant as the remains of the business. It was in fact left 
with the plaintiff when defendant went looking for work. The 
evidence does show that the initial payment on the family home 
came from the plaintiff's home that she had prior to this 
marriage. Plaintiff's claim for $19,672.00 which was the down 
payment on the new home is awarded to the plaintiff. He has 
purchased an additional home, furniture, and vehicles since the 
separation. The evidence indicates that none of these has any 
equity as the amounts owed are equal to the value. The 
household furniture and fixtures in the family home in Ogden 
have not been valued. The furniture, fixture, and personal 
property in plaintiff's possession is awarded to her. The 
furniture, vehicles, and property in defendant's possession is 
awarded to him, the home is to be divided as a martial asset. 
The parties were married fourteen years prior to the 
failure of the business and the defendant leaving and looking 
for employment. At the present time it is a eighteen year 
marriage. This is not an instance were plaintiff stayed home 
and raised the children while the defendant progressed through 
the business world to arrive at a favorable position. The 
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plaintiff had four children prior to her marriage to the 
defendant and the defendant accepted them as family and assisted 
in their growth and well being. Defendant's position in the 
business world was arrived at after his separation from the 
plaintiff. The evidence shows that he still looks at her 
children as his family. It also supports his version that he 
wanted her to join him in Las Vegas but she refused. She claims 
they did not discuss her moving, however she does" acknowledge 
that they did discuss renting out the home here in Ogden. 
This is also not a case were plaintiff has become 
accustomed to a high standard of living. Prior to defendant's 
business failing the evidence is that he was grossing $500.00 
per week. This is a gross of $26,000.00 a year which was used 
for the family needs. His tax returns indicate actual income 
considerably less. Plaintiff is now employed part time at 
Internal Revenue Service as a GS-5 Step 1 with a gross yearly 
salary of $16,973. Being part time her gross pay was $8,280.00 
in addition thereto she drew unemployment for ten weeks which 
would give her a gross $9,780. Her testimony was that when she 
goes back to work this year it will be at an increased amount. 
Employment history indicates since she graduated from high 
school in 1953 she has basically worked in clerking positions or 
assembly line positions she has never earned high income. Her 
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health is good and she is suffering no disabilities. Evidence 
shows that by leaving the area the defendant was able to go to 
work for Smith's and at one time was a store manager. By reason 
of his contracting rheumatoid arthritis he has had to downgrade 
his job to that of a buyer. Evidence indicates his income will 
be approximately $56,000. When defendant left he did not 
totally abandon plaintiff. He left between $8,000.00 and 
$10,000.00 cash which she could use for house payments and-
payment of bills and in addition thereto she has sold off some 
property like the recreational vehicle for some $9,000.00 plus 
he did send her some funds. Plaintiff did obtain a temporary 
order of $1,500.00 per month alimony. Defendant filed an 
objection to the request for temporary alimony but he was not 
present at the hearing and no action was ever taken on his 
objection to the order. 
Plaintiff filed an affidavit of monthly expenses showing 
present monthly expense of $1,796.00 per month, her request for 
alimony would cover this with the exception of approximately 
$300. The problem with her affidavit is it is not a true 
indication of her expenses. It is more a wish list than a needs 
list. Example would be the transportation figure of some 
$531.00 a month and her testimony is she drives very little. 
Her personal expenses of $270.00 per month includes recreational 
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and travel of over $130.00 and she testified she does not travel 
and spends very little on recreation. Her food expenses total 
$350.00 a month simply is not realistic. It appears the 
affidavit is made more with the view to obtain high alimony than 
to advising the court of her actual expenses. 
I hold that the home is a marital asset and is to be 
subject to division between the parties. The home is to be 
sold. The plaintiff is to be awarded the first $19,672.00 which 
would be for her equity of her home prior to the marriage. 
After the expense of sale is deducted, the remaining equity is 
to be divided between the parties. 
The request for all of the home plus alimony is not 
realistic or fair. 
The plaintiff did obtain an order for temporary support 
of $1,500.00 a month, plaintiff has been unable to make these 
payments and is delinquent in the sum of $27,507. I order that 
the defendant is to pay to the plaintiff the sum of $1,000 per 
month. This $1,000.00 shall be a payment of $600.00 per month 
on the back alimony that was awarded and $400.00 per month on 
going. Plaintiff shall have the use and occupancy of the home 
until it is sold and the the defendant's lien thereon shall not 
draw interest. The payment of the $27,507.00 accumulated 
alimony at $600.00 a month will take 45 months to clear up and 
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this figure also shall not draw interest. The payment of the 
back award will take 3.8 years and by that time plaintiff should 
be employed on a full time basis. The $400.00 per month 
continuing alimony shall continue as an assistance fro her 
subsequent housing. 
Neither party has much retirement accumulated, however 
each shall have interest in the others per the Woodward formula. 
Plaintiff testified she did not know if health and accident 
insurance was available to her through her employment• If it is 
she should obtain that, if it is not, then the defendant is to 
assist in obtaining whatever benefit he can through his 
employment at her expense. 
His payment of $12,000.00 a year plus her current 
earnings even on a part time basis of $9,780.00 a year give her a 
gross income of almost $22,000.00 per year. This equates almost 
to a figure equal to what the family was living on when defendant 
was drawing $500.00 a week from the business prior to the 
separation and is a monthly amount greater than the amounts set 
out in the affidavit of monthly expenses as filed by the 
plaintiff. Therefore each party is to pay their own attorney's 
fees and costs. 
Defendant's counsel to prepare findings, conclusion, and 
judgment in accordance herewith. 
Memorandum Decielon 
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DATED th*-s « daY o f November, 1991, 
DONALD O. HYDE, Judg 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
j hereby certify that on the ' day of November, 
19SI. I. sent a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum 
Decision to counsel as follows: 
David B. Havas 
2604 Madison Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Don E. Cassity 
115 Social Hall Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOY A. HOAGLAND, 
vs. 
COLIN G. HOAGLAND, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant, 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
« $ ft 
CASE NO. 890903214 
RONALD O. HYDE, JUDGE 
The above-entitled matter having come on for Trial on the 28th 
day of November, 1991, before the Honorable Ronald O. Hyde, Judge, 
sitting without a jury, and the Court having heard the evidence 
presented in behalf of and by the Plaintiff, and in behalf of and 
by the Defendant, and the Court having heretofore entered its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and good cause appearing 
therefore, it is now, 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. That the Plaintiff and the Defe idant should be and hereby 
are divorced from each other, said Decree of Divorce to become 
final upon execution by the Court and upon entry of the Decree of 
Divorce. 
2. That the real estate and improvements thereon accumulated 
by the parties, Plaintiff and Defendant, during the marriage, 
! Recorded Book 
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commonly described as 151 West 5400 South, Washington Terrace, 
Weber County, State of Utah, and more particularly described as 
Lot 163, South Ridge Subdivision No. 
7 located in Weber County, State of 
Utah as Recorded in the Weber County 
Recorder's Office 
should be and hereby is determined to be a marital asset. 
3. It is hereby ordered that the said real estate and 
improvements is to be forthwith listed for sale, and is to be sold, 
and the Plaintiff and Defendant are ordered to execute any and all 
documents both with respect to the offering of the property for 
sale, and the closing and deeding of the property to the buyer, as 
will become necessary on a timely and appropriate basis, consistent 
with the need of sales persons, title company personnel, and the 
terms of the Sales Agreement between the Seller and the Buyer. The 
Plaintiff and Defendait are both orderec: to be cooperative in all 
respects with regard to the offering of sale, and the closing of 
the sale of the said real estate and improvements. 
4. The Plaintiff should be and hereby is awarded from the net 
sale proceeds of the said real estate the first $19,672.00, and it 
is ordered that the balance of the proceeds from the sale of the 
real estate is to be paid one-half to the Plaintiff and one-half to 
the Defendant. 
5. Judgment for unpaid temporary alimony in the sum of 
$27,507.00 is hereby awarded to the Plaintiff, and against the 
Defendant, said sum to be paid to the Defendant at the rate of 
$600.00 per month, until the full sum of $27,507.00 has been paid 
to the Plaintiff. 
2 
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6. That ongoing alimony should be and hereby is ordered to be 
paid by the Defendant to the Plaintiff in the sum of $400.00 per 
month. 
7. That Plaintiff shall be permitted to use and occupy the 
residence of the parties until it is sold. Plaintiff is ordered to 
cooperate in all reasonable manner with the sales persons engaged 
in obtaining a qualified buyer for the said real estate. 
8. The Defendant shall have a lien for his portion of the 
equity in the real estate described in paragraph 3 above, which 
lien shall not draw interest, nor shall :.nterest be incurred as to 
the Plaintiff's $19,672.00 sum to be paid out of the sale proceeds, 
nor shall interest be paid or accumulate on the past due alimony 
awarded to the Plaintiff, in the sum of $27,507.00. 
9. That it is hereby ordered tha*': based upon Woodward vs. 
Woodward, and the formula setforth therein for division of 
retirement income, th^t each of the parties shall have claim in the 
other parties retirement income to the extent it was earned by 
Plaintiff and Defendent as of October 2£. 1991. 
10. It is ordered that the Plaintiff shall, if health and 
accident insurance is available to her through her employment, to 
obtain said insurance, and it is further ordered that in the event 
that it is not available to the Plaintiff at her employment, that 
the Defendant is to assist the Plaintiff in obtaining whatever 
insurance benefit, if any, he can for the Plaintiff through his own 
employment, at the expense of the Plaintiff. 
11. That the Plaintiff and the Defendant should, and it is 
3 
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hereby Ordered that each party shall pay their own attorneys fees 
and costs incurred herein. 
, 1991. DATED this y day of )^JJJ* _ 
BY THECOURT: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
On this 31 day of November, 1991.. I certify that I mailed, 
postage prepaid, a cp^ py of the foregoinc Decree of Divorce to the 
Plaintiff by mailing a copy thereof to her attorney, David Burt 
Havas, at his off ice ..at 2604 Madison Avenue, Ogden, Utah 84401. 
^ \'<. 
o ;.•>..vi Or- UTAH \ 
CCtWV Of WEBER ) ss; 
\(Heresy certify That Th i& f t W C o w < V ^ / i ? 






DONN E. CASSITY (#594) 
ROMNEY, NELSON & CASSITY 
Attorneys for Defendant 
115 Social Hall Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-3261 
DISTRICT COURT 
I. — • .... « J o i . I I 
*n 21 DEC H PF1 2 44 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOY A. HOAGLAND, 
vs. 
COLIN G. HOAGLAND, 
Plaintiff, 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
CASE NO. 890903214 
JUDGE: RONALD 0. HYDE 
Defendant. 
DEC 0 A 199' 
The above-entitled matter came on for Trial before the 
Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, Second Judicial District Court Judge for 
Weber County, sitting without a Jury, at 9:30 a.m. on the 28th day 
of October, 1991, and the Plaintiff, Joy A. Hoagland, and her 
attorney, David Burt Havas, were present, and the Defendant, Colin 
G. Hoagland, and his attorney, Donn E. C&ssity, were present, and 
the Plaintiff having presented her testimony, exhibits and 
evidence, and the Defendant having presented his testimony, 
exhibits and testimony, and the attorneys having made their closing 
arguments, and the Court now being fully informed in the premises, 
now makes its 
FINDINGS OF FAC^ 
1. That the Plaintiff, Joy A. Holland, resided in Weber 
1 
County, State of Utah in excess of 90 days prior to the filing of 
the Complaint in the above-entitled matter by the Plaintiff. 
2. That the Plaintiff and Defendant were married in Elko, 
Nevada on the 5th day of September, 1973•> 
3. That no children were born as issue of the marriage, but 
at the time of the marriage of the Plaintiff and the Defendant four 
children, siblings of the Plaintiff from another marriage lived in 
the home and were raised substantially by the Plaintiff and 
Defendant, with the Defendant, Step-Father, providing a substantial 
part of the support economically for the children, and which 
Defendant developed a very close and loving relationship with each 
of Plaintiff's children, which relationship has continued to the 
present. 
4. That durinc the year of 190 i marital problems arose 
between the parties, rand they were separated twice for a few weeks 
but were reunited near the end of 1986, ct which time the Defendant 
who was unemployed, and, whose grocery business had been closed, 
and gone through Bankruptcy, left the residence of the parties in 
Ogden Utah to seek employment, which he found in Las Vegas, Nevada. 
5. That when the Plaintiff married the Defendant he was an 
employee of Smiths, a grocery company business, but later Defendant 
quit his employment at Smiths and opened his own grocery store, 
which business was operated until August of 1986, at which time the 
Defendant and his brother closed the business and filed the 
Business Corporation in Bankruptcy. 
6. That prior to the closing of the business the Defendant 
2 
conveyed title to the residence and lot of the parties to the 
Plaintiff as a security against the possibility that Creditors 
might claim against the real and/or personal property of the 
Plaintiff and Defendant. No such claim was ever made by any 
Creditor, however. 
7. That during 1986 the parties developed serious problems in 
their marriage relationship. 
8. That the Defendant in January of 1987 found gainful 
employment in Las Vegas, Nevada, again working for Smiths in the 
grocery business. After being settled in Las Vegas in his new 
employment. Defendant purchased a newly constructed residence and 
lot and, invited the Plaintiff to come to Las Vegas. At the time 
of the visit the Defendant showed the Plaintiff the house, but when 
the Defendant asked her to move to Nevada so they could live 
together in the new home, she refused, stating, "My home is in 
Ogden, Utah". The Defendant told the Plaintiff that they could 
lease the home in Ogden and thus retain it, and that a good 
business friend in Ogden would manage it and make certain that it 
was protected in their absence. The Plaintiff refused to move to 
Nevada, and effectively the parties were then separated and have 
never since that period lived together. The marital parties have, 
and have had irreconcilable differences since at least April of 
1987. 
9. That at the time Defendant left the parties home in his 
pursuit of employment in Nevada the Defendant took with him some 
$300.00 plus dollars, together with a pick-up truck that was 
3 
encumbered and a motorcycle. He left in the possession of the 
Plaintiff approximately $8,000.00 to $10,000.00 in cash, a motor 
home of the parties, which the Defendant believed had a value of 
$12,000.00 to $15,000.00, but which at a later time the Plaintiff 
sold for $9,000.00 cash. The Defendant also left with the 
Plaintiff all of the furniture, the house, lot, swimming pool, and 
a 1980 Lincoln Town Car, and a 1976 Chevrolet. None of the 
vehicles were encumbered at that time. That none of the $8,000.00 
- $10,000.00 cash, or the $9,000.00 received by the Plaintiff from 
sale of the motor home was shared by Plaintiff with the Defendant. 
10. That after it became obvious by April of 1987 that the 
Plaintiff was flatly refusing to rejoin the Defendant, as his wife, 
the Plaintiff and Defendant agreed upon a divorce, and the 
Defendant proposed that the Plaintiff regain as her sole property 
all of the vehicles, money, house and ILci , furniture and household 
furnishings, and other personal property that he had left with 
Plaintiff at the time Defendant went to Nevada, and that the 
Plaintiff forego any claim to alimony from the Defendant. The 
Defendant believed, until the Complaint for Divorce was filed by 
Plaintiff that Plaintiff had agreed to accept the marital assets as 
her own, in lieu of any claim for alimony from the Defendant. 
By the time the Complaint in the above matter was filed by the 
Plaintiff the Defendant had been transferred by his employer from 
Las Vegas to Reno, Nevada. 
11. A Hearing on an Order to Show Cause was held in the 
absence of the Defendant, he being in Nevada at his work, and an 
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Order for temporary alimony was ordered by the Court in the sum of 
$1,500.00 per month. That at the time of Trial of the case, 
temporary unpaid alimony had accrued in the total sum of 
$27,507.00. 
12. That at the time of the marriage of the Plaintiff and the 
Defendant the Plaintiff had an equity in a house and lot and the 
Plaintiff and Defendant lived in the said house for a period of 
time. The Plaintiff house was sold. During the time that the 
Plaintiff and the Defendant lived in the Plaintiff's home the 
Defendant made the mortgage payments. Defendant also essentially 
paid all of the mortgage payments on the home that the parties own 
at the present time, and which was purchased by the parties 
subsequent to the sale of the Plaintiff's home. 
13. That since the separation of the parties the Plaintiff 
temporarily had a daughter and a child live with her, but otherwise 
Plaintiff has lived ii the home, alone, since the separation of the 
parties. The home is a four bedroom, two level home, with swimming 
pool, patio and covered porch, two car garage within the house, and 
no mortgage is owing on the said real estate. The house and lot 
have been appraised twice, for $97,000 and for $85,000.00 
14. That neither the Plaintiff nor Defendant has much 
retirement benefits accumulated, if any-
15. That since the filing of the divorce the Defendant has 
been transferred from Reno, Nevada by his employer to Phoenix, 
Arizona, and Defendant has purchased a house and lot in Glendale, 
Arizona, and a pick-up truck and a boat in which there is 
5 
essentially no equity. 
16. That the Plaintiff has had the sole use of the parties 
real estate, furniture, fixtures and all of the other personal 
property accumulated by the parties during the marriage since the 
separation of the parties in December of 1986. 
17. That the Plaintiff had not become accustomed to a high 
standard of living during the marriage, it appearing from the 
evidence that prior to Defendant's business failing in 1986 he was 
grossing approximately $500.00 per week which was used for family 
needs. The parties income tax returns for years prior thereto 
indicate actual income considerably less. 
18. Plaintiff is employed currently as she has been for some 
time with the United.States Treasury Department, Internal Revenue 
Services as a GS-5 Step One with a gross yearly salary of 
$16,973.00, and a part-time gross pay of $8,280.00, plus 
unemployment for ten -veeks giving her a jross income of $9,780.00 
per year. 
19. Plaintiff testified that she would receive an increased 
income when she returns to work in 1992. 
20. That the Plaintiff's employment history indicates that 
she graduated from High School in 1953 and has basically worked in 
clerking positions or assembly line positions, and has never earned 
a high income. 
21. Plaintiff's health is good and she suffers no 
disabilities. 
22. Defendant after reobtaining employment with Smiths became 
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a Store Manager, but he developed Rheumatoid Arthritis and has had 
to down grade his job to that of a buyer, and his income will be 
approximately $56,000.00 per annum. 
23. That Plaintiff filed an Affidavit of monthly expenses 
showing present monthly expenses of $1,796.00 per month, however, 
Plaintiff's Affidavit is more a wish list than a needs list. 
An example of that fact is that the transportation figure that 
the Plaintiff uses in her monthly expenses list shows $531.00 for 
transportation expense though her testimony is that she drives very 
little. She also indicates that her personal expenses of $270.00 
per month includes recreational and travel of over $130.00, and she 
testified that she does not travel and spends very little money on 
recreation. In addition, she recites that her food expenses 
totalled $350.00 per month which is not a realistic sum to spend 
for one person, and reflects a desire on. the part of the Plaintiff 
to obtain high alimony rather than reasonably advising the Court of 
the Plaintiff's actual expenses. 
24. That the Plaintiff claims that the house and lot in 
Washington Terrace was deeded to her in exchange for any claim she 
had against ownership of the grocery store business that was 
operated by the Defendant and his brother. 
25. The Court finds, however, that the Deed was conveyed at 
a time when the grocery business of the Defendant and his brother 
was closing down and near Bankruptcy and ultimately went into 
Bankruptcy, and that there was little, or no value in the business 
at the time of the conveyance by Defendant of title by Quit Claim 
7 
Deed to the Plaintiff. 
26. The evidence shows that the Defendant still, at this 
date, looks at the Plaintiff's children as his family, which fact 
supports Defendants version that he wanted Plaintiff to join him in 
Las Vegas to continue the marriage, but that Plaintiff refused to 
do so. 
27. The Plaintiff claims that no such discussion of her 
moving to Nevada took place, but Plaintiff does acknowledge that 
Plaintiff and Defendant did discuss renting out the residence and 
lot in Washington Terrace, Ogden, Utah. 
The Court having entered its Findings of Feet now enters its 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the Court has jurisdiction in the above-entitled 
matter. 
2. That the parties have irreconcilable differences one with 
the other, and they should be divorced from each other, and the 
divorce should be final upon execution and entry by the Court. 
3. That the residence and lot located at 151 West 5400 South, 
Washington Terrace, Weber County, State of Utah, is a marital 
asset. 
4. That the said real estate should be sold. 
5. That from the sale proceeds, the Plaintiff should be 
awarded, the first $19,672.00, without interest, representing 
Plaintiff's equity from her home prior to the marriage of the 
parties. 
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6. That after the expenses of sale are deducted the balance 
of the remaining equity should be divided, one-half to the 
Plaintiff, and one-half to the Defendant, 
7. That the Court determines that there is delinquent alimony 
owed to the Plaintiff in the sum of $27,507.00. 
8. That the Plaintiff should be awarded on going alimony. 
9. That the Defendant should pay to the Plaintiff the sum of 
$600.00 per month in liquidation of the delinquent alimony sum of 
$27,507.00, which the Court calculates will take 45.845 months, and 
the Defendant should not be required to pay interest on the 
delinquent alimony. 
10. The payment of the back alimony will take Defendant 3.82 
years, and by that time the Plaintiff should be employed on a full 
time basis. 
11. That the Plaintiff should have the use and occupancy of 
the parties house and lot until it is sold, and the Defendant's 
lien on the equity in the real estate should not draw interest. 
12. That neither party has much retirement benefits 
accumulated, but each should have an interest in the others 
retirement per the Woodward v. Woodward formula. 
13. If the Plaintiff can obtain health and accident insurance 
through her employment she should obtain that, but if the said 
insurance is not available to the Plaintiff then the Defendant 
should assist the Plaintiff in obtaining whatever medical benefit, 
if any, she can through Defendants employment, at the Plaintiff's 
expense. 
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14. The Plaintiff in receiving $12,000.00 a year for 3.8 
years from the Defendant, plus her current earnings on a part time 
basis of $9,780.00 or more, will provide Plaintiff with a gross 
income of almost $22,000.00 per year, which is almost equal to the 
income which the parties were living on when the Defendant was 
drawing $500.00 per week from his business prior to the separation 
of the parties, and represents a monthly amount greater than the 
amounts set out in the Affidavit of monthly expenses as filed by 
the Plaintiff. Therefore, the Plaintiff and the Defendant should 
each pay their own attorneys fees and costs. 
DATED this */ day of *^>JUL^ , 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
On this _ ^ 3 — d a y o f ^^^n^^^^6^ 1991, I certify that 
I mailed, postage prepaid, to the Plaintiff's attorney, David Burt 
Havas, at his office at 2604 Madison Avenue, Ogden, Utah 84401, a 
copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in 
the above-entitled case. 
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) CASE NO. 890903214 
COLIN G. HOAGLAND, ) RONALD O. HYDE, JUDGE 
Defendant. 
) 
On the 9th day of January, 1992, at the hour of 10:00 a.m. the 
Motion of the Plaintiff to Amend Findings of Fact in the above-
entitled matter came on for Hearing, and the Plaintiff was present 
and represented by her counsel, David Burt Havas, and the Defendant 
was not present but was represented by his counsel, Donn E. 
Cassity, and after argument in behalf of Plaintiff's Motion by 
Plaintiff's counsel, and the objection and argument of counsel for 
the Defendant, Donn E. Cassity, the Court now being fully advised 
in the premises does now 
ORDER that the Findings of Fact heretofore executed by the 
Court on the 4th day of December, 1991, be amended as to Paragraph 
9 of the Findings of Fact wherein on page 4, third line down, the 
words "which the Defendant believed had a value of $12,000.00 to 
$15,000.00, but" be deleted and the balance of said sentence in 
1 
J Page •!«/•<<*•<, 1 
Indexed ] 
said Paragraph 9 be left as written, and it is further Ordered the 
Paragraph 10 of the Findings of Fact be amended by deleting the 
first three lines of Paragraph 10 including the first word of the 
fourth line of Paragraph 10, and insert in place of those words as 
follows "That the parties had conversation regarding distribution 
of the marital assets, and the Defendant", and starting with the 
word "proposed" in the fourth line of the Findings of Fact the 
balance of the Paragraph 10 is to remain as previously written. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the last sentence of Paragraph 12 
on Page 5 of the Findings of Fact shall be amended by deleting the 
said sentence beginning with the word "Defendant" and ending with 
the word "home". 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no further amendments proposed by 
the Plaintiff are approved, and are hereby denied. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in the event sale of the marital 
real estate and division of the net proceeds thereof are upheld by 
the Utah Court of Appeals, that in view of the fact that the real 
estate of the parties commonly known as 151 West 5400 South 
Washington Terrace, Weber County, State of Utah, is by decree of 
divorce ordered to be sold, and since the Defendant's equity in the 
said marital real estate will not, because of Plaintiff's appeal, 
be timely paid to Defendant, due to Plaintiff's appeal of the 
Court's decision, that interest on the net equity of the Defendant 
in the said real estate, when it is sold, shall bear interest from 
date of Plaintiffs Notice of Appeal at the rate of ten (10%) 
percent per annum, which interest shall be paid to the Defendant in 
2 
Indexed I 
addition to the principal amount of the net sales price awarded to 
Defendant, following sale of the marital real estate, so long as 
the Defendant pays the Plaintiff alimony consistant with the 
provisions of the Decree of Divorce, executed and entered by the 
Court on December 4, 1991. 
The motion of the Plaintiff that she be awarded interest on 
the Plaintiff's Judgment for delinquent alimony that has been 
awarded Plaintiff by the Court should be and hereby is denied, it 
appearing that any delay in the performance of the terms of the 
Decree of Divorce with respect to payment of past due alimony to 
the Plaintiff, by the Defendant, will be caused, if at ail, solely 
by the Appeal of this case by the Plaintiff. 
The Order of the Court as to payment of interest to the 
Defendant, is not intended by the Court to limit any right 
Defendant otherwise .has withrrespect to the marital estate. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on the /b ' day of January, 1992, I mailed, 
postage prepaid, a copy of the foregoing Order in the above-
entitled case to the Plaintiff by mailing a copy thereof to her 
3 
counsel, David Burt Havas, at his office at 2604 Madison Avenue, 
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DONN E. CASSITY (#594, 
ROMNEY, NELSON & CASSITY 
Attorneys for Defendant 
115 Social Hall Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-3261 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOY A. HOAGLAND, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
COLIN G. HOAGLAND, 
Defendant. 
The above-entitled matter came on for Trial before the 
Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, .Second Judicial District Court Judge for 
Weber County, sitting without a Jury, at 9:30 a.m. on the 28th day 
of October, 1991, and the Plaintiff, Joy A. Hoagland, and her 
attorney, David Burt lavas, were present, and the Defendant, Colin 
G. Hoagland, and his attorney, Donn E. O.ssity, were present, and 
the Plaintiff havirj presented her testimony, exhibits and 
evidence, and the Defendant having presented his testimony, 
exhibits and testimony, and the attorneys having made their closing 
arguments, and the Court now being fully informed in the premises, 
now makes its 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That the Plaintiff, Joy A. Hoagland, resided in Weber 
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County, State of Utah in excess of 90 days prior to the filing of 
the Complaint in the above-entitled matter by the Plaintiff, 
2. That the Plaintiff and Defendant were married in Elko, 
Nevada on the 5th day of September, 1973. 
3. That no children were born as issue of the marriage, but 
at the time of the marriage of the Plaintiff and the Defendant four 
children, siblings of the Plaintiff from another marriage lived in 
the home and were raised substantially by the Plaintiff and 
Defendant, with the Defendant, Step-Father, providing a substantial 
part of the support economically for the children, and which 
Defendant developed a very close and loving relationship with each 
of Plaintiff's children, which relationship has continued to the 
present. 
4. That during the year of 1986 marital problems arose 
between the parties, .and they were separated twice for a few weeks 
but were reunited near the end of 1986, at which time the Defendant 
who was unemployed, and, whose grocery business had been closed, 
and gone through Bankruptcy, left the residence of the parties in 
Ogden Utah to seek employment, which he found in Las Vegas, Nevada. 
5. That when the Plaintiff married the Defendant he was an 
employee of Smiths, a grocery company business, but later Defendant 
quit his employment at Smiths and opened his own grocery store, 
which business was operated until August of 1986, at which time the 
Defendant and his brother closed the business and filed the 
Business Corporation in Bankruptcy. 
6. That prior to the closing of the business the Defendant 
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conveyed title to the residence and lot of the parties to the 
Plaintiff as a security against the possibility that Creditors 
might claim against the real and/or personal property of the 
Plaintiff and Defendant* No such claim was ever made by any 
Creditor, however. 
7. That during 1986 the parties developed serious problems in 
their marriage relationship. 
8. That the Defendant in January of 1987 found gainful 
employment in Las Vegas, Nevada, again working for Smiths in the 
grocery business. After being settled in Las Vegas in his new 
employment, Defendant purchased a newly constructed residence and 
lot and, invited the Plaintiff to come to Las Vegas. At the time 
of the visit the Defendant showed the Plaintiff the house, but when 
the Defendant asked her to move to Nevada so they could live 
together in the new home, she refused, stating, MMy home is in 
Ogden, Utah". The Defendant told the Plaintiff that they could 
lease the home in Ogden and thus retain it, and that a good 
business friend in Ogden would manage it and make certain that it 
was protected in their absence. The Plaintiff refused to move to 
Nevada, and effectively the parties were then separated and have 
never since that period lived together. The marital parties have, 
and have had irreconcilable differences since at least April of 
1987. 
9. That at the time Defendant left the parties home in his 
pursuit of employment in Nevada the Defendant took with him some 
$300.00 plus dollars, together with a pick-up truck that was 
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encumbered and a motorcycle. He left in the possession of the 
Plaintiff approximately $8,000.00 to $10,000.00 in cash, a motor 
home of the parties, which at a later time the Plaintiff sold for 
$9,000.00 cash. The Defendant also left with the Plaintiff all of 
the furniture, the house, lot, swimming pool, and a 1980 Lincoln 
Town Car, and a 1976 Chevrolet. None of the vehicles were 
encumbered at that time. That none of the $8,000.00 - $10,000.00 
cash, or the $9,000.00 received by the Plaintiff from sale of the 
motor home was shared by Plaintiff with the Defendant. 
10. That the parties had irreconcilable differences. That the 
parties had conversation regarding distribution of the marital 
assets, and the Defendant proposed that the Plaintiff retain as her 
sole property all of the vehicles, money, house and lot, furniture 
and household furnishings, and other personal property that he had 
left with Plaintiff at the time Defendant went to Nevada, and that 
the Plaintiff forego any claim to alimony from the Defendant. The 
Defendant believed, until the Complaint for Divorce was filed by 
Plaintiff that Plaintiff had agreed to accept the marital assets as 
her own, in lieu of any claim for alimony from the Defendant. 
By the time the Complaint in the above matter was filed by the 
Plaintiff the Defendant had been transferred by his employer from 
Las Vegas to Reno, Nevada. 
11. A Hearing on an Order to Show Cause was held in the 
absence of the Defendant, he being in Nevada at his work, and an 
Order for temporary alimony was ordered by the Court in the sum of 
$1,500.00 per month. That at the time of Trial of the case, 
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temporary unpaid alimony had accrued in the total sum of 
$27,507.00. 
12. That at the time of the marriage of the Plaintiff and the 
Defendant the Plaintiff had an equity in a house and lot and the 
Plaintiff and Defendant lived in the said house for a period of 
time. The Plaintiff house was sold. During the time that the 
Plaintiff and the Defendant lived in the Plaintiff's home the 
Defendant made the mortgage payments. That following the 
separation of the parties the Defendant sent monies to the 
Plaintiff for some time thereafter. 
13. That since the separation of the parties the Plaintiff 
temporarily had a daughter and a child live with her, but otherwise 
Plaintiff has lived in the home, alone, since the separation of the 
parties. The home is a four bedroom, two level home, with swimming 
pool, patio and covered porch, two car garage within the house, and 
no mortgage is owing on the said real estate. The house and lot 
have been appraised twice, for $97,000 and for $85,000.00 
14. That neither the Plaintiff nor Defendant has much 
retirement benefits accumulated, if any. 
15. That since the filing of the divorce the Defendant has 
been transferred from Reno, Nevada by his employer to Phoenix, 
Arizona, and Defendant has purchased a house and lot in Glendale, 
Arizona, and a pick-up truck and a boat in which there is 
essentially no equity. 
16. That the Plaintiff has had the sole use of the parties 
real estate, furniture, fixtures and all of the other personal 
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property accumulated by the parties during the marriage since the 
separation of the parties in December of 1986. 
17. That the Plaintiff had not become accustomed to a high 
standard of living during the marriage, it appearing from the 
evidence that prior to Defendant's business failing in 1986 he was 
grossing approximately $500.00 per week which was used for family 
needs. The parties income tax returns for years prior thereto 
indicate actual income considerably less. 
18. Plaintiff is employed currently as she has been for some 
time with the United States Treasury Department, Internal Revenue 
Services as a GS-5 Step One with a gross yearly salary of 
$16,973.00, and a part-time gross pay of $8,280.00, plus 
unemployment for ten weeks giving her a gross income of $9,780.00 
per year. 
19. Plaintiff testified that she would receive an increased 
income when she returns to work in 1992. 
20. That the Plaintiff's employment history indicates that 
she graduated from High School in 1953 and has basically worked in 
clerking positions or assembly line positions, and has never earned 
a high income. 
21. Plaintiff's health is good and she suffers no 
disabilities. 
22. Defendant after reobtaining employment with Smiths became 
a Store Manager, but he developed Rheumatoid Arthritis and has had 
to down grade his job to that of a buyer, and his income will be 
approximately $56,000.00 per annum. 
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23. That Plaintiff filed an Affidavit of monthly expenses 
showing present monthly expenses of $1,796.00 per month, however, 
Plaintiff's Affidavit is more a wish list than a needs list. 
An example of that fact is that the transportation figure that 
the Plaintiff uses in her monthly expenses list shows $531.00 for 
transportation expense though her testimony is that she drives very 
little. She also indicates that her personal expenses of $270.00 
per month includes recreational and travel of over $130.00, and she 
testified that she does not travel and spends very little money on 
recreation. In addition, she recites that her food expenses 
totalled $350.00 per month which is not a realistic sum to spend 
for one person, and reflects a desire on the part of the Plaintiff 
to obtain high alimony rather than reasonably advising the Court of 
the Plaintiff's actual expenses. 
24. That the Plaintiff claims that the house and lot in 
Washington Terrace was deeded to her in exchange for any claim she 
had against ownership of the grocery store business that was 
operated by the Defendant and his brother. 
25. The Court finds, however, that the Deed was conveyed at 
a time when the grocery business of the Defendant and his brother 
was closing down and near Bankruptcy and ultimately went into 
Bankruptcy, and that there was little, or no value in the business 
at the time of the conveyance by Defendant of title by Quit Claim 
Deed to the Plaintiff. 
26. The evidence shows that the Defendant still, at this 
date, looks at the Plaintiff's children as his family, which fact 
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supports Defendants version that he wanted Plaintiff to join him in 
Las Vegas to continue the marriage, but that Plaintiff refused to 
do so. 
27. The Plaintiff claims that no such discussion of her 
moving to Nevada took place, but Plaintiff does acknowledge that 
Plaintiff and Defendant did discuss renting out the residence and 
lot in Washington Terrace, Ogden, Utah. 
The Court having entered its Findings of Fact now enters its 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the Court has jurisdiction in the above-entitled 
matter. 
2. That the parties have irreconcilable differences one with 
the other, and they should be divorced from each other, and the 
divorce should be final upon execution and entry by the Court. 
3. That the residence and lot located at 151 West 5400 South, 
Washington Terrace, Weber County, State of Utah, is a marital 
asset. 
4. That the said real estate should be sold. 
5. That from the sale proceeds, the Plaintiff should be 
awarded, the first $19,672.00, without interest, representing 
Plaintiff's equity from her home prior to the marriage of the 
parties. 
6. That after the expenses of sale are deducted the balance 
of the remaining equity should be divided, one-half to the 
Plaintiff, and one-half to the Defendant, 
8 
7. That the Court determines that there is delinquent alimony 
owed to the Plaintiff in the sum of $27,507.00. 
8. That the Plaintiff should be awarded on going alimony. 
9. That the Defendant should pay to the Plaintiff the sum of 
$600.00 per month in liquidation of the delinquent alimony sum of 
$27,507.00, which the Court calculates will take 45.845 months, and 
the Defendant should not be required to pay interest on the 
delinquent alimony. 
10. The payment of the back alimony will take Defendant 3.82 
years, and by that time the Plaintiff should be employed on a full 
time basis. 
11. That the Plaintiff should have the use and occupancy of 
the parties house and lot until it is sold, and the Defendant's 
lien on the equity in the real estate should not draw interest. 
12. That neither party has much retirement benefits 
accumulated, but each should have an interest in the others 
retirement per the Woodward v. Woodward formula. 
13. If the Plaintiff can obtain health and accident insurance 
through her employment she should obtain that, but if the said 
insurance is not available to the Plaintiff then the Defendant 
should assist the Plaintiff in obtaining whatever medical benefit, 
if any, she can through Defendants employment, at the Plaintiff's 
expense. 
14. The Plaintiff in receiving $12,000.00 a year for 3.8 
years from the Defendant, plus her current earnings on a part time 
basis of $9,780.00 or more, will provide Plaintiff with a gross 
9 
income of almost $22,000,00 per year, which is almost equal to the 
income which the parties were living on when the Defendant was 
drawing $500.00 per week from his business prior to the separation 
of the parties, and represents a monthly amount greater than the 
amounts set out in the Affidavit of monthly expenses as filed by 
the Plaintiff. Therefore, the Plaintiff and the Defendant should 
each pay their own attorneys fees ajsid costs. 
inuary, DATED this clJd day of ^rf 1992. 
BY THEUCOURT: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
On this /H ^aay of January, 1992, I certify that I mailed, 
postage prepaid, to the Plaintiff's attorney, David Burt Havas, at 
his office at 2604 Madison Avenue, Ogden, Utah 84401, a copy of the 
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CASE NO. 890903214 
RONALD 0. HYDE, JUDGE 
On the 9th day of January, 1992, at the hour of 10:00 a.m. the 
Motion of the Plaintiff to Amend Findirgs of Fact in the above-
entitled matter came on for Hearing, and the Plaintiff was present 
and represented by her counsel, David Burt Havas, and the Defendant 
was not present but was represented by his counsel, Donn E. 
Cassity, and after argument in behalf of Plaintxtf's Motion by 
Plaintiff's counsel, and the objection and argument of counsel for 
the Defendant, Donn E. Cassity, the Court now being fully advised 
in the premises does now 
ORDER that the Findings of Fact heretofore executed by the 
Court on the 4th day of December, 1991, be amended as to Paragraph 
3 so as to be factually and grammatically correct, amended as to 
Paragraph 9 of the Findings of Fact, wherein on page 4, third line 
down, the words "wh^ch the Defendant believed had a value of 
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$12,000.00 to $15,000.00, but11 be deleted and the balance of said 
sentence in said Paragraph 9 be left as written, and it is further 
Ordered the Paragraph 10 of the Findings of Fact be amended by 
deleting the first three lines of Paragraph 10 including the first 
word of the fourth line of Paragraph 10, and insert in place of 
those words as follows "That the Defendant testified that the 
parties had conversation regarding distribution of the marital 
assets, and that the Defendant", and starting with the word 
"proposed" in the fourth line of the Findings of Fact the balance 
of the Paragraph 10 is to remain as previously written, excepting 
that the last sentence cf Paragraph 1Q will read as follows: "The 
Defendant testified that until the Complaint for divorce was filed 
by the Plaintiff that the Defendant believed that Plaintiff had 
agreed with him to accept the marital assets as her own in lieu of 
Plaintiff making any claim for alimony from the Defendant." 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the third and fourth sentences of 
Paragraph 12 on Page 5 of the Findings of Fact shall be deleted. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no further amendments proposed by 
tne Plaintiff are approved, and are hereby denied, 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in the event sale of the marital 
real estate and division of the net proceeds thereof are upheld by 
the Utah Court of Appeals, that in view of the fact that the real 
estate of the parties commonly known as 151 West 5400 South 
Washington Terrace, Weber County, State of Utah, is by decree of 
divorce ordered to be sold, and since the Defendant's equity in the 
said marital real estate will not, because of Plaintiff's appeal, 
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be timely paid to Defendant due to Plaintiff's appeal of the 
Court's decision that interest on the net equity of the Defendant 
in the said real estate, when it is sold, shall bear interest from 
date of Plaintiff's Notice of Appeal at the rate of ten (10%) 
percent per annum, which interest shall be paid to the Defendant in 
addition to the principal amount of the net sales price awarded to 
Defendant, following sale of the marital real estate, so. long as 
the Defendant pays the Plaintiff alimony consistent with the 
provisions of the Decree of Divorce, executed and entered by the 
Court on December 4, 1991. 
The Motion of the Plaintiff that she be awarded interest on 
the Plaintiff's Judgment for delinquent alimony that has been 
awarded Plaintiff by the Court should be and hereby is denied. 
The Order of the Court as to payment of interest to the 
Defendant, is not intended by the Cojrt to limit any right 
Defendant otherwise has with respect to the marital estate. 
DATED this day of
 m , 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
JUDGE RONALD 0. HYDE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on the / 7^ day of April, 1992, I mailed, 
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postal prepaia, a cop, <* « -
 £oregoina Oraer in the above-
^ case to the Pontiff hy - i U n g a copy thereof to her 
Ogden, Utah 84401. 
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ROMNEY, NELSON & CASSITY 
Attorneys for Defendant 
115 Social Hall Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-3261 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOY A. HOAGLAND, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
COLIN G. HOAGLAND, 
Defendant. 
The above-entitled matter came on for Trial before the 
Honorable Ronald O. Hyde, Second Judicial District Court Judge for 
Weber County, sitting without a Jury, at 9:30 a.m. on the 28th day 
of October, 1991, and the Plaintiff, Joy A. Hoagland, and her 
attorney, David Burt riavas, were present, and the Defendant, Colin 
G. Hoagland, and his attorney, Donn E. Cassity, were present, and 
the Plaintiff having presented her testimony, exhibits and 
evidence, and the Defendant having presented his testimony, 
exhibits and evidence and the attorneys having made their closing 
arguments and the Court now being full} informed in the premises, 
now makes its 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That the Plaintiff, Joy A. Hoagland, resided in Weber 
rn \c oo 
SECOND AMENDED FINDINGS 
OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
CASE NO. 890903214 
JUDGE: RONALD O. HYDE 
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County, State of Utah in excess of 90 days prior to the filing of 
the Complaint in the above-entitled matter by the Plaintiff. 
2. That the Plaintiff and Defendant were married in Elko, 
Nevada on the 5th day of September, 1973. 
3. That no children were born as issue of the marriage, but 
from the time of the marriage of the Plaintiff and the Defendant 
four children, each borne of the Plaintiff from a prior marriage 
lived in the parties home and were raised by the Plaintiff and 
Defendant, with the Defendant, Stej. -Father, providing the 
substantial part of the support economically for the children, 
during which time the Defendant developed a very close and loving 
relationship with each of Plaintiff's children, which relationship 
has continued to the present. 
4. That during the year of 1986 marital problems arose 
between the parties, and they were separated twice for a few weeks 
but were reunited near the end of 1986, at which time the Defendant 
who was unemployed and whose grocery business had been closed, and 
gone through Bankruptcy, left the residence of the parties in Ogden 
Utah to seek employment, which he found in Las Vegas, Nevada. 
5. That when the Plaintiff married the Defendant he was an 
employee of Smiths, a grocery company business, but later Defendant 
quit his employment at Smiths and opened his own grocery store, 
which business was operated until August of 1986, at which time the 
Defendant and his brother closed the business and filed the 
Business Corporation in Bankruptcy. 
6. That prior to the closing of the business the Defendant 
2 
conveyed title to the residence and lot of the parties to the 
Plaintiff as a security against the possibility that Creditors 
might claim against the real and/or personal property of the 
Plaintiff and Defendant. No such claim was ever made by any 
Creditor, however. 
7. That during 1986 the parties developed serious problems in 
their marriage relationship. 
8. That the Defendant in January of 1987 found gainful 
employment in Las Vegas, Nevada, again working for Smiths in the 
grocery business. After being settled in Las Vegas in his new 
employment, Defendant purchased a newly constructed residence and 
lot, and invited the Plaintiff to come to Las Vegas. At the time 
of the visit the Defendant showed the Plaintiff the house, but when 
the Defendant asked her to move to Nevada so they could live 
together in the new~nome, she refused, stating, "My home is in 
Ogden, Utah". The Defendant told the Plaintiff that they could 
lease the home in Ogden and thus retain it, and that a good 
business friend in Ogden would manage it and make certain that it 
was protected in their absence. The Plaintiff refused to move to 
Nevada, and effectively the parties were then separated and have 
never since that period lived together. The marital parties have, 
and have had irreconcilable differences since at least April of 
1987. 
9. That at the time Defendant left the parties home in his 
pursuit of employment in Nevada the Defendant took with him some 
$300.00 plus dollars, together with a pick-up truck that was 
3 
encumbered and a motorcycle. He left in the possession of the 
Plaintiff approximately $8,000.00 to $10,000.00 in cash, the motor 
home of the parties, which at a later time the Plaintiff sold for 
$9,000.00 cash. The Defendant also left with the Plaintiff all of 
the furniture, the house lot, swimming pool, and a 1980 Lincoln 
Town Car, and a 1976 Chevrolet. None of the vehicles were 
encumbered at that time. That none of the $8,000.00 - $10,000.00 
cash, or the $9,000.00 received by the Plaintiff from sale of the 
motor home was shared by Plaintiff with the Defendant. 
10. That the parties had irreconcilable differences. That 
the Defendant testified that the parties had conversation regarding 
distribution of the marital assets, .and that the Defendant proposed 
that the Plaintiff retain as her sole property all of the vehicles, 
money, house and lot, furniture and household furnishings, and 
other personal property that he had left with the Plaintiff at the 
time Defendant went to Nevada, and that the Plaintiff forego any 
claim to alimony from the Defendant. The Defendant testified that 
until the Complaint for Divorce was filed by the Plaintiff that he 
believed that Plaintiff had agreed with him to accept the marital 
assets as her own, in lieu of Plaintiff making any claim for 
alimony from the Defendant. 
By the time the Complaint in the above matter was filed by the 
Plaintiff the Defendant had been transferred by his employer from 
Las Vegas to Reno, Nevada. 
11. A Hearing on an Order to Show Cause was held in the 
absence of the Defendant, he being in Nevada at his work, and an 
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Order for temporary alimony was ordered by the Court in the sum of 
$1,500.00 per month. That at the time of Trial of the case, 
temporary unpaid alimony had accrued in the total sum of 
$27,507.00. 
12. That at the time of the marriage of the Plaintiff and the 
Defendant the Plaintiff had an equity in a house and lot and the 
Plaintiff and Defendant lived in the said house for a period of 
time. The Plaintiff's house was soli. That following the 
separation of the parties the Defendant sent monies to the 
Plaintiff for some time thereafter. 
13. That since the separation of the parties the Plaintiff 
temporarily had a daughter and a child live with her, but otherwise 
Plaintiff has lived ir the home, alone, since the separation of the 
parties. The home is~a four bedroom, two level home, with swimming 
pool, patio and covered porch, two car garage within the house, and 
no mortgage is owing on the said real estate. The house and lot 
have been appraised twice, for $97,000.00 and for $85,000.00. 
14. That neither the Plaintiff nor Defendant has much 
retirement benefits accumulated, if any. 
15. That since the filing of the divorce the Defendant has 
been transferred from Reno, Nevada by his employer to Phoenix, 
Arizona, and Defendant has purchased a house and lot in Glendale, 
Arizona, and a pick-up truck, and a boat in which there is 
essentially no equity. 
16. That the Plaintiff has had the sole use of the parties 
real estate, furniture, fixtures and all of the other personal 
5 
property accumulated by the parties during the marriage since the 
separation of the parties in December of 1986. 
17. That the Plaintiff had not become accustomed to a high 
standard of living during the marriage, it appearing from the 
evidence that prior to Defendant's business failing in 1986 he was 
grossing approximately $500.00 per week which was usedifor family 
needs. The parties income tax returns for years prior thereto 
indicate actual income considerably less. 
18. Plaintiff is employed currently as she has been for some 
time with the United States Treasury Department, Internal Revenue 
Service as a GS-5 Step One with a gross yearly salary of 
$16,973.00, and a part-time gross pay ojf $8,280.00, plus 
unemployment for ten weeks giving her a gross income of $9,780.00 
per year. 
19. Plaintiff ..testified that she would receive an increased 
income when she returns to work in 1992. 
20. That the Plaintiff's employment history indicates that 
she graduated from High School in 1953 and has basically worked in 
clerking positions or assembly line positions, and has never earned 
a high income. 
21. Plaintiff's health is good and she suffers no 
disabilities. 
22. Defendant after reobtaining employment with Smiths became 
a Store Manager, but he developed Rheumatoid Arthritis and has had 
to down grade his job to that of a buyer, and his income will be 
approximately $56,000.00 per annum. 
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23. That Plaintiff filed an Affidavit of monthly expenses 
showing present monthly expenses of $1,796.00 per month, however, 
Plaintiff's Affidavit is more a wish list than a needs list. 
An example of that fact is that the transportation figure that 
the Plaintiff uses in her monthly expenses list shows $531.00 for 
transportation expense though her testimony is that she drives very 
little. She also indicates that her personal expenses of $270.00 
per month includes recreational and travel of over $130.00, and she 
testified that she does not travel and spends very little money on 
recreation. In addition, she recites that her food expenses 
totalled $350.00 per month which is not a realistic sum to spend 
for one person, and reflects a desire on the part of the Plaintiff 
to obtain high alimony rather than reasonably advising the Court of 
the Plaintiff's actual expenses. 
24. That the Flaintiff claims that the house and lot in 
Washington Terrace was deeded to her in exchange for any claim she 
had against ownership of the grocery store business that was 
operated by the Defendant and his brother. 
25. The Court finds, however, that the Deed was conveyed at 
a time when the grocery business of the Defendant and his brother 
was closing down and near Bankruptcy and ultimately went into 
Bankruptcy, and that there was little, or no value in the business 
at the time of the conveyance by Defendant of title by Quit-Claim 
Deed to the Plaintiff. 
26. The evidence shows that the Defendant still, at this 
date, looks at the Plaintiff's children as his family, which fact 
7 
supports Defendant's version that he wanted Plaintiff to join him 
in Las Vegas to continue the marriage, but that Plaintiff refused 
to do so. 
27. The Plaintiff claims that no such discussion of her 
moving to Nevada took place, but Plaintiff does acknowledge that 
Plaintiff and Defendant did discuss renting out the residence and 
lot in Washington Terrace, Ogden, Utah. 
The Court having entered its Findings of Fact now enters its 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the Court has jurisdiction in the above-entitled 
matter. 
2. That the part.ies have irreconcilable differences one with 
the other, and they should be divorced -from each other, and the 
divorce should be final upon execution and entry by the Court. 
3. That the residence and lot located at 151 West 5400 South, 
Washington Terrace, Weber County, State of Utah, is a marital 
asset. 
4. That the said real estate should be sold. 
5. That from the sale proceeds, the Plaintiff should be 
awarded, the first $19,672.00, without interest, representing 
Plaintiff's equity from her prior home prior to the marriage of the 
parties. 
6. That after the expenses of sale are deducted the balance 
of the remaining equity should be divided, one-half to the 
Plaintiff, and one-half to the Defendant. 
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7. That the Court determines that there is delinquent alimony 
owed to the Plaintiff in the sum of $27,507-00. 
8. That the Plaintiff should be awarded on going alimony. 
9. That the Defendant should pay to the Plaintiff the sum of 
$600.00 per month in liquidation of the delinquent alimony sum of 
$27,507.00, which the Court calculates will take 45.845 months, and 
the Defendant should not be required to pay interest on the 
delinquent alimony. 
10. The payment of the back alimony will take Defendant 3.82 
years, and by that time the Plaintiff should be employed on a full 
time basis. 
11. That the Plaintiff should have the use and occupancy of 
the parties house and lot until it is sold, and the Defendant's 
lien on the equity in the real estate should not draw interest. 
12. That neither party has xnach retirement benefits 
accumulated, but each should have an interest in the others 
retirement per the Woodward v. Woodward formula. 
13. If the Plaintiff can obtain health and accident insurance 
through her employment she should obtain that, but if the said 
insurance is not available to the Plaintiff then the Defendant 
should assist the Plaintiff in obtaining whatever medical benefit, 
if any, she can through Defendant's employment, at the Plaintiff's 
expense• 
14. The Plaintiff in receiving $12,000.00 a year for 3.8 
years from the Defendant, plus her current earnings on a part time 
basis of $9,780.00, or more, will provide Plaintiff with a gross 
9 
income of almost $22,000.00 per year, which is almost equal to the 
income which the parties were living on when the Defendant was 
drawing $500.00 per week from his business prior to the separation 
of the parties, and represents a monthly amount greater than the 
amounts set out in the Affidavit of monthly expenses as filed by 
the Plaintiff. Therefore, the Plaintiff and the Defendant should 
each pay their own attorneys fees and costs. 
DATED this *] day of "^Y^J^A S , 1992, 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
On this IH1^ day of April, 1992, I certify that I mailed, 
postage prepaid, to the Plaintiff's attorney, David Burt Havas, at 
his office at 2604 Madison Avenue, Ogden# Utah 84401, a copy of the 
foregoing Second Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in 




15-1-2 CONTRACTS AND OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL 
15-1-2, 15-l-2a. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Sections 15-1-2, 15-l-2a (L. 1955, ch. 20, § 1; 1965, ch. 25, § 1), relating to 
1907, ch. 46, § 2; C.L. 1907, § 1241x; C.L. maximum interest rates on loans and condi-
1917, § 3321; R.S. 1933,44-0-2; L. 1935, ch. 42, tional sales contracts, were repealed by Laws 
§ 1; C. 1943, 44-0-2; L. 1953, ch. 24, §§ 1, 2; 1969, ch. 18, § 9.103. 
15-1-3. Calculated by the year. 
Whenever in any statute or deed, or written or verbal contract, or in any 
public or private instrument whatever, any certain rate of interest is men-
tioned and no period of time is stated, interest shall be calculated at the rate 
mentioned by the year. 
History: L. 1907, ch. 46, § 7; C.L. 1907, 
§ 1241x5; C.L, 1917, § 3326; R.S. 1933 & C. 
1943, 44-0-3. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 47 CJ.S. Interest 5 42. 
Key Numbers. — Interest *» 40. 
15-1-4. Interest on judgments. 
Any judgment rendered on a lawful contract shall conform thereto and shall 
bear the interest agreed upon by the parties, which shall be specified in the 
judgment; other judgments shall bear interest at the rate of 12% per annum. 
History: L. 1907, ch. 46, § 11; C.L. 1907, Cross-References. — Interest to be in-
§ 1241x9; C.L. 1917, § 3330; R.S. 1933 & C. eluded in judgment entry, Rules of Civil Proce-
1943, 44-0-4; L. 1981. ch. 73, § 2. ^^ R u ] e 54 ( e). 
Amendment Notes. — The 1981 amend-
ment increased the interest rate from 8% to 
12%. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Allowance of interest before judgment. 
Amendment of judgment. 
Collection of interest. 
Eminent domain. 
Estates of decedents. 
Federal court judgment. 
Interest during pendency of appeal. 
Late payment of property division in divorce action. 
Personal judgments. 
Prejudgment interest. 





NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Both parties at fault. 
Cruel treatment. 
Both parties at fault. 
Marriage may be dissolved by making a 
grant of divorce to each party where each was 
equally at fault.* Mullins v. Mullins, 26 Utah 
2d 82, 485 P.2d 663 (1971). 
Cf*ifc\ treatment. 
Acts constituting cruel conduct sufficient to 
cause great mental distress need not be aggra-
vated and more severe when directed toward 
the husband than when directed toward the 
wife. Hansen v. Hansen, 537 P.2d 491 (Utah 
1975). 
30-3-3. Temporary alimony and suit money. 
The court may order either party to pay to the clerk a sum of money for the 
separate support and maintenance of the adverse party and the children, and 
to enable such party to prosecute or defend the action. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1210; 
C.L. 1917, § 2998; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
40-3-3. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Appealability of order. 
Appeal from older. 
Attorney fees. 
Attorney fees for appeal. 
Attorney's lien on alimony. 
Contempt proceedings. 
Contesting petitioner for modification. 
Costs and expenses on appeal. 
Discretion of trial court. 
Enforcement of order or decree. 
Jurisdiction. 
Mandamus. 
Order of court. 
Stipulation and effect thereof. 
Appealability of order. 
Formal order made in divorce action, called a 
^judgment" directing that judgment be entered 
for benefit of defendant's attorneys, is not final 
and appealable. Rolando v. District Court, 72 
Utah 459, 271 P. 225 (1928). 
Appeal from order. 
Where there were no findings or evidence in 
record as to attorney's fees, Supreme Court re-
manded issue for disposition by trial court but 
allowed wife's attorney $100 for services ren-
dered with reference to husband's appeal from 
judgment modifying divorce decree. Parish v. 
Parish, 84 Utah 390, 35 P.2d 999 (1934). 
Supreme Court assumed that evidence sup-
ported award of suit money to wife where no 
testimony as to wife's need was before the 
court on appeal on judgment roll from the de-
cree of no cause of action in husband and 
awarding of expenses of suit, attorney's fees 
and temporary alimony to wife. Weiss v. Weiss, 
111 Utah 353, 179 P.2d 1005 (1947). 
Attorney fees. 
Allowance of $200 as wife's attorney's fee in 
divorce proceeding was not inadequate even 
though husband- was worth approximately 
$40,000, where proceedings from time of com-
niencement until entry of decree lasted less 
than two months and trial itself was completed 
in less than two days. Blair v. Blair, 40 Utah 
306, 121 P. 19, 38 L.R.A. (n.s.) 269, 1914D 
Ann. Cas. 989 (1912). 
Where decree of divorce was obtained by 
rnother of minor children against father, who 
was required to pay certain sum periodically 
for support, caie, maintenance, and education 
of such children, and he, without sufficient 
cause, refused to comply with decree, as result 
of which mother was compelled to bring pro-
ceedings against him, father was required to 
pay counsel fees in such proceedings. Tribe v. 
Tribe, 59 Utah 112, 202 P. 213 (1921)." 
Court properly awarded attorney's fees to 
wife in subsequent proceeding on application of 
wife for arrears in alimony. Christensen v. 
Christensen, 65 Utah 597, 239 P. 501 (1925). 
Fifty dollars was a reasonable fee where wife 
petitioned to require husband to show cause 
why he should not be punished for contempt for 
failure to pay support money and husband filed 
cross-petition for modification of decree and 
where it was shown that wife was without 
means to prosecute the cause or pay counsel. 
Scott v. Scott, 105 Utah 376, 142 P.2d 198 
(1943). 




30-3-10.6 HUSBAND AND WIFE 
(3) If the court finds that an action under this section is filed or answered 
frivolously and in a manner designed to harass the other party, the court shall 
assess attorney's fees as costs against the offending party. 
History: C. 1953, 30-3-10.4, enacted by L. 
1988, ch. 106, § 5; 1990, ch. 112, § 2. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
ment, effective March 8,1990, rewrote the first 
two sentences in Subsection (2), which had 
read "(a) The order of joint legal custody is ter-
minated upon the filing of a motion for termi-
nation by: (i) both parents; or (ii) one parent, 
History: C. 1953, 30-3-10.6, enacted by L. 
1987, ch. 117, § 1; 1988, ch. 1, § 3; 1988, ch. 
203, § 1; 1989, ch. 62, § 1; ch. 115, $ 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend-
ment by ch. 62, effective April 24,1989, substi-
tuted "62A-11-311" for "62A-11-309" at the 
end of Subsection (4). 
The 1989 amendment by ch. 115, effective 
when notice of the motion is sent by certified 
mail to the other parent and an affidavit is 
filed with the motion, indicating the motion 
has been mailed as required by this subsection. 
(b) The order of joint legal custody shall be re-
placed by the court with an order of sole legal 
custody under Section 30-30-10." 
April 24,1989, deleted "reduced to an adminis-
trative or judicial judgment for a specific 
amount and" before "docketed" in Subsection 
(4). 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
30-3-10.6. Payment under child support order — Judg-
ment. 
(1) Each payment or installment of child or spousal support under any child 
support order, as defined by Subsection 62A-11-401(3), is, on and after the 
date it is due: 
(a) a judgment with the same attributes and effect of any judgment of a 
district court, except as provided in Subsection (2); 
(b) entitled, as a judgment, to full faith and credit in this and in any 
other jurisdiction; and 
(c) not subject to retroactive modification by this or any other jurisdic-
tion, except as provided in Subsection (2). 
(2) A child or spousal support payment under a child support order may be 
modified with respect to any period during which a petition for modification is 
pending, but only from the date notice of that petition was given to the obli-
gee, if the obligor is the petitioner, or to the obligor, if the obligee is the 
petitioner. 
(3) For purposes of this section, jurisdiction" means a state or political 
subdivision, a territory or possession of the United States, the District of 
Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. 
(4) The judgment provided for in Subsection (l)(a), to be effective and en-
forceable as a lien against the real property interest of any third party relying 
on the public record, shall be docketed in the district court in accordance with 
Sections 78-22-1 and 62A-11-311. 
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(c) The court shall then determine whether ORS must release the loca-
tion and address of the custodial parent and any children, and issue an 
order accordingly. 
History: C. 1953, 62A-11-331, enacted by Counsel because of the enactment at the same 
L. 1989, ch. 108, § 1; recodified as C. 1953, session of another § 62A-11-331. 
62A-11-332. Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 108 De-
compiler's Notes. — This section was en- came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to 
acted as § 62A-11-331, but was recodified by Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 




As used in this part: 
(1) "Child" means a son or daughter who is under the age of 18 years, 
or who is physically or mentally handicapped and incapable of earning 
income sufficient to support himself. 
(2) "Child support" means a financial obligation ordered by a court or 
administrative body for the support of a child, including current periodic 
payments and all arrearages. Child support includes court ordered obliga-
tions for the support of a spouse or former spouse with whom the child 
resides if the spousal support is collected with the child support. 
(3) "Child support order" means a judgment, decree, or order of a court 
or administrative body whether interlocutory or final, whether or not 
prospectively or retroactively modifiable, whether incidental to a proceed-
ing for divorce, judicial or legal separation, separate maintenance, pater-
nity, guardianship, civil protection, or otherwise, which: 
(a) establishes or modifies child support; 
(b) reduces child support arrearages to judgment; or 
(c) establishes child support or confirms a child support order un-
der Chapter 31, Title 77. 
(4) "Delinquent" or "delinquency" means that child support in an 
amount at least equal to current child support payable for one month is 
overdue. 
(5) "Income" means earnings or compensation paid or payable for per-
sonal services whether denominated as wages, salary, commission, bonus, 
or contract payment, or denominated as advances on future wages, salary, 
commission, bonus, contract payment, or otherwise. "Income" specifically 
includes, but is not limited to: 
(a) all gain derived from capital assets, labor, or both, including 
profit gained through sale or conversion of capital assets; 
(b) periodic payments made under pension or retirement programs 
or insurance policies of any type; 
(c) unemployment compensation benefits; and 
(d) workers' compensation benefits. 
(6) "Jurisdiction" means a state or political subdivision, a territory or 
possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, or the Common-
wealth of Puerto Rico. 
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(7) "Obligor" means a person owing a duty of child support. 
(8) "Obligee" means a person to whom a duty of support is owed, or who 
is entitled to reimbursement of support or public assistance. 
(9) "Office" means the Office of Recovery Services. 
(10) "Payor" means an employer or any person who is a source of in-
come to an obligor. 
History: C. 1953, 62A-11-401, enacted by ment programs, or insurance policies, and un-
L. 1988, ch. 1 § 314; 1989, ch. 62, § 20. employment compensation insurance benefits"; 
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend- and rewrote Subsection (8) which read M,Obh-
ment effective April 24,1989 rewrote Subsec- .
 m e a n s a n o r e n t l t e n t l t l e d to re_ 
T^^^i ,JS J ^ S S — tld suppof ;ncl»ding an agency 
denominated as wages, salary, commission, bo- OT™oth?T J""«liction 
nus, contract payment, or otherwise, including Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch 1, § 408 
gam derived from capital assets, periodic pay- makes the act effective on January 19, 1988 
ments made under pension programs, retire-
62A-11-402. Administrative procedures. 
Because the procedures of this part are mandated by federal law they shall 
be applied for the purposes specified in this part and control over any other 
statutory administrative procedures. 
History: C. 1953, 62A-11-402, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch 1, § 408 
L. 1988, ch. 1, § 315. makes the act effective on January 19, 1988 
62A-11-403. Provision for income withholding in child 
support order. 
When a child support order is issued or modified in this state after July 1, 
1985, it shall authorize the withholding of income as a means of collecting 
child support. The order shall specify that when child support is delinquent, as 
defined by Subsection 62A-11-40H4), appropriate income withholding proce-
dures shall apply to existing and future payors, and that all withheld income 
shall be submitted to the office. This provision of the order may be effective 
until the obligor no longer owes child support to the obligee. 
History: C. 1953, 62A-11-403, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch 1, § 408 
L. 1988, ch. 1, § 316. makes the act effective on January 19, 1988 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 79 Am Jur 2d Welfare 
Laws § 81 
62A-11-404. Procedure for obligee seeking income with-
holding. 
(1) An obligee may apply for income withholding services by the office, 
under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, or seek income withholding in a 
district court of competent jurisdiction, when a delinquency occurs under a 
child support order which includes authorization of income withholding. In 
order to proceed with a civil action, the obligee shall petition the court for a 
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instructions. Morgan v. Quailbrook Condomin-
ium Co., 704 P.2d 573 (Utah 1985). 
Written instructions. 
—Failure to tender. 
Waiver. 
Where plaintiff had failed to tender a writ-
ten instruction on burden of proof he could not 
claim error in the lack of such instruction. Ful-
ler v. Zinik Sporting Goods Co., 538 P.2d 1036 
(Utah 1975). 
Cited in Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350, 
366 P.2d 701 (1961); Hill v. Cloward, 14 Utah 
2d 55, 377 P.2d 186 (1962); Ortega v. Thomas, 
14 Utah 2d 296, 383 P.2d 406 (1963); Meier v. 
Christensen, 15 Utah 2d 182, 389 P.2d 734 
(1964); Memmott v. U.S. Fuel Co., 22 Utah 2d 
356, 453 P.2d 155 (1969); Telford v. Newell J. 
Olsen & Sons Constr. Co., 25 Utah 2d 270, 480 
P.2d 462 (1971); Flynn v. W.P. Harlin Constr. 
Co., 29 Utah 2d 327, 509 P.2d 356 (1973); 
McGinn v. Utah Power & Light Co., 529 P.2d 
423 (Utah 1974); Henderson v. Meyer, 533 P.2d 
290 (Utah 1975); Lamkin v. Lynch, 600 P.2d 
530 (Utah 1979); State v. Hall, 671 P.2d 201 
(Utah 1983); Highland Constr. Co. v. Union 
Pac. R.R., 683 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984); Gill v. 
Timm, 720 P.2d 1352 (Utah 1986); Penrod v. 
Carter, 737 P.2d 199 (Utah 1987); King v. 
Fereday, 739 P.2d 618 (Utah 1987); State v. 
Cox, 751 P.2d 1152 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); 
Ramon ex rel. Ramon v. Farr, 770 P.2d 131 
(Utah 1989); Anton v. Thomas, 806 P.2d 744 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991); Reeves v. Gentile. 813 
P.2d 111 (Utah 1991); Hodges v. Gibson Prods. 
Co., 811 P.2d 151 (Utah 1991); Home Sav. & 
Loan v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 166 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 26 (Ct. App. 1991). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 75A Am. Jur . 2d Trial 
§ 1077 et seq. 
C.J .S. — 88 C.J.S. Trial §§ 266 to 448. 
A.L.R. — Propriety and prejudicial effect of 
instructions in civil case as affected by the 
manner in which they are written, 10 A.L.R.3d 
501. 
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury 
action, to prove future pain and suffering and 
to warrant instructions to jury thereon, 18 
A.L.R.3d 10. 
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury 
action, to prove impairment of earning capac-
ity and to warrant instructions to jury thereon, 
18 A.L.R.3d 88. 
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury 
action, to prove permanence of injuries and to 
warrant instructions to jury thereon, 18 
A.L.R.3d 170. 
Propriety and effect, in eminent domain pro-
ceeding, of instruction to the jury as to land-
owner's unwillingness to sell property, 20 
A.L.R.3d 1081. 
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case 
stressing desirability and importance of agree-
ment, 38 A.L.R.3d 1281. 
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case 
commenting on weight of majority view or au-
thorizing compromise, 41 A.L.R.3d 845. 
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case ad-
monishing jurors to refrain from intransigence 
or reflecting on integrity or intelligence of ju-
rors, 41 A.L.R.3d 1154. 
Construction of statutes or rules making 
mandatory the use of pattern or uniform ap-
proved jury instructions, 49 A.L.R.3d 128. 
Necessity and propriety of instructing on al-
ternative theories of negligence or breach of 
warranty, where instruction on strict liability 
in tort is given in products liability case, 52 
A.L.R.3d 101. 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, construc-
tion and effect of provision in Rule 51, and sim-
ilar state rules, that counsel be given opportu-
nity to make objections to instructions out of 
hearing of jury, 1 A.L.R. Fed. 310. 
Key Numbers. — Trial «=» 182 to 296. 
Rule 52. Findings by the court. 
(a) Effect In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an 
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its 
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 
58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall simi-
larly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the 
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of 
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, 
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given 
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. 
The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be 
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considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court follow-
ing the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of 
decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). The 
court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its 
decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 
when the motion is based on more than one ground. 
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after 
entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional find-
ings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with 
a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made 
in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of 
the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not 
the party raising the question has made in the district court an objection to 
such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for judg-
ment, or a motion for a new trial. 
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions 
for divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the 
parties to an issue of fact: 
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial; 
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause; 
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 52, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — Masters, Rule 53. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Adoption. 
—Abandonment of contract. 
—Advisory verdict. 
—Breach of contract. 
—Child custody. 
—Contempt. 
—Credibility of witnesses. 
—Denial of motion. 






—Submission by prevailing party. 
Court's discretion. 
—Water dispute. 
Findings of state engineer. 
Amendment. 
—Motion. 
Conformance with original findings. 
New trial. 
Notice of appeal. 
Time. 
Tolling of appeal period. 
When made. 
—Overruling or vacation. 
Another district judge. 
Lack of notice. 




—Preclusion of summary judgment. 
—Relation to pleadings. 
Failure to object to findings. 
How findings entered. 
Judicial review. 
—Equity cases. 
—Standard of review. 
Conclusions of law. 
Criminal cases. 
Criminal trials. 
Findings of facts by jury. 
Intent. 
Juvenile proceedings. 
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eree's order to participate in appeal secured by specified by statute, court order, or stipulation 
another creditor, 22 A.L.R.3d 914. as terminating reference, 71 A.L.R.4th 889. 
Power of successor or substituted master or ^ a r e '^xceptional conditions" justifying 
r . , , * • J A reference under Rule of Civil Procedure 53(b> 
referee to render decision or enter judgment on i A T P Fed 922 
testimony heard by predecessor, 70 A.L.R.3d
 R e y N m n b e r s . _ E q u i t y „ 3 9 3 to 3 9 5 ? 401> 
1 0 7 9
- 404 to 406; Reference *=» 3 et seq., 35 to 77, 99 
Referee's failure to file report within time et seq. 
PART VIL 
JUDGMENT. 
Rule 54. Judgments; costs. 
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree 
and any order from which an appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a 
recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings. 
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and^or involving multiple parties. 
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a 
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and'or when multiple 
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to 
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express 
determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an 
express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determina-
tion and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, 
which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of 
fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the 
claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision 
at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the 
rights and liabilities of all the parties. 
(c) Demand for judgment. 
(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is en-
tered by default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the 
party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not 
demanded such relief in his pleadings. It may be given for or against one 
or more of several claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case 
requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as 
between or among themselves. 
(2) Judgment by default. A judgment by default shall not be different 
in kind from, or exceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in the 
demand for judgment. 
(d) Costs. 
(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is 
made either in a statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall be 
allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise 
directs; provided, however, where an appeal or other proceeding for re-
view is taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection with such 
appeal or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final determination 
of the cause. Costs against the state of Utah, its officers and agencies 
shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law. 
(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must within five 
days after the entry of judgment serve upon the adverse party against 
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demanded such relief in his pleadings. It may be given for or against one 
or more of several claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case 
requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as 
between or among themselves. 
(2) Judgment by default. A judgment by default shall not be different 
in kind from, or exceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in the 
demand for judgment. 
(d) Costs. 
(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is 
made either in a statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall be 
allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise 
directs; provided, however, where an appeal or other proceeding for re-
view is taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection with such 
appeal or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final determination 
of the cause. Costs against the state of Utah, its officers and agencies 
shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law. 
(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must within five 
days after the entry of judgment serve upon the adverse party against 
whom costs are claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs 
and necessary disbursements in the action, and file with the court a like 
memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's knowledge the 
items are correct, and that the disbursements have been necessarily in-
curred in the action or proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the costs 
claimed may, within seven days after service of the memorandum of costs, 
file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed by the court in which the 
judgment was rendered. 
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the 
time of or subsequent to the service and filing of the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, but before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be 
considered as served and filed on the date judgment is entered. 
(3), (4) [Deleted.] 
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment. The clerk must 
include in any judgment bigned by him any interest on the verdict or decision 
from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if the same have been taxed or 
ascertained. The clerk must, within two days after the costs have been taxed 
or cifc'jeiuilneu. m any case where not included m the judgment, insen the 
amount thereof in a blank left in the judgment for that purpose, and make a 
similar notation thereof in the register of actions and in the judgment docket 
(Amended effective January 1, 1985.) 
Amendment Notes. — Subdivisions (d)(3) Cross-References. — Continuances, discre 
and (d)(4), relating to the award of costs by the tion to require payment of costs, Rule 40(b> 
appellate court and costs in original proceed- Judges' retirement fee, taxing as costs 
mgs before the Supreme Court, were repealed § 49-6-301 
with the adoption of the Utah Rules of Appel- State, payment of costs awarded against 
late Procedure, effective January 1, 1985 See, § 78-27-13 
now, Rule 34(d), Utah R App P. Stay of judgment upon multiple claims, Rule 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 62(h) 
Rule 54, F R C P. Witness fees, taxing as costs, § 21-5-8 
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jjUle 57. Declaratory judgments. 
The procedure for obtaining a declaratory judgment pursuant to Chapter 33 
;fitle 78, U.C.A. 1953, shall be in accordance with these rules, and the right 
Atrial by jury may be demanded under the circumstances and in the manner 
^vided in Rules 38 and 39. The existence of another adequate remedy does 
[ .preclude a judgment for declaratory relief in cases where it is appropriate. 
^ e court may order a speedy hearing of an action for a declaratory judgment 
nd may advance it on the calendar. 
r
 0mpil e r s Notes. — This rule is similar to 
& 57, F.R.C.P. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Oil Shale Corp. v. Larson, 20 Utah 
<, 369, 438 P.2d 540 (1968). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
^m. Jur. 2d. — 22A Am. Jur. 2d Declara- declaratory relief in state court, 33 A.L.R.4th 
jry Judgments §§ 183, 186, 203 et seq. 146. 
C.J.S. — 26 C.J.S. Declaratory Judgments Key Numbers. — Declaratory Judgment «=» 
. 17. 18, 104, 155. 41, 42, 251, 367. 
A.L.R» — Right to jury trial in action for 
Rule 58A, Entry. 
(a) Judgment upon the verdict of a jury. Unless the court otherwise 
jirects and subject to the provisions of Rule 54(b), judgment upon the verdict 
of a jury shall be forthwith signed by the clerk and filed. If there is a special 
,erdict or a general verdict accompanied by answers to interrogatories re-
:urned by a jury pursuant to Rule 49, the court shall direct the appropriate 
udgment which shall be forthwith signed by the clerk and filed. 
lb) Judgment in other cases. Except as provided in Subdivision (a) hereof 
md Subdivision (b)(1) of Rule 55, all judgments shall be signed by the judge 
and filed with the clerk. 
(c) When judgment entered; notation in register of actions and judg-
ment docket. A judgment is complete and shall be deemed entered for all 
Durposes, except the creation of a lien on real property, when the same is 
signed and filed as herein above provided. The clerk shall immediately make 
a notation of the judgment in the register of actions and the judgment docket. 
(d) Notice of signing or entry of judgment. The prevailing party shall 
oromptly give notice of the signing or entry of judgment to all other parties 
and shall file proof of service of such notice with the clerk of the court. How-
ever, the time for filing a notice of appeal is not affected by the notice require-
ment of this provision. 
(e) Judgment after death of a party. If a party dies after a verdict or 
decision upon any issue of fact and before judgment, judgment may neverthe-
ess be rendered thereon. 
(f) Judgment by confession. Whenever a judgment by confession is au-
thorized by statute, the party seeking the same must file with the clerk of the 
court in which the judgment is to be entered a statement, verified by the 
defendant, to the following effect: 
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(1) If the judgment to be confessed is for money due or to become due, it 
shall concisely state the claim and that the sum confessed therefor is 
justly due or to become due; 
(2) If the judgment to be confessed is for the purpose of securing the 
plaintiff against a contingent liability, it must state concisely the claim 
and that the sum confessed therefor does not exceed the same; 
(3) It must authorize the entry of judgment for a specified sum. 
The clerk shall thereupon endorse upon the statement, and enter in the 
judgment docket, a judgment of the court for the amount confessed, with costs 
of entry, if any. 
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985; Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — Paragraph 
(d) is intended to remedy the difficulties sug-
gested by Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., 14 
Utah 2d 334, 384 P.2d 109 (1963). 
Compiler's Notes. — The subject matter of 
this rule is dealt with in Rules 58 and 79(a), 
F.R.C.P. 
ANALYSIS 
Death of party. 
—During appeal. 
Other cases. 




Notice to parties. 
—Filing. 
—Unsigned minute entry. 
Cited. 
Death of party. 
—During appeal. 
Where jury returned verdict for plaintiff but 
judge entered judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict for defendant, death of plaintiff during 
appeal did not abate appeal since court, under 
Subdivision (e) of this rule, could still enter 
judgment on verdict if judgment notwithstand-
ing verdict were reversed. Bates v. Burns, 2 
Utah 2d 362, 274 P.2d 569 (1954). 
Other cases. 
—Unsigned minute entry. 
An appeal from a summary judgment was 
dismissed where the record showed only an 
unsigned minute entry and no judgment or or-
der signed by the judge. Wisden v. City of 




Whether plaintiff had right to have action 
Cross-References. — Judgment against 
person dying after verdict or decision, not a 
lien on realty, § 78-22-1.1. 
Judgment by confession authorized, § 78-22-
3. 
dismissed upon payment of costs presented ju-
dicial question to be determined by court, so 
that where court ordered case dismissed and 
clerk entered "case dismissed" in register of 
actions but formal judgment had not been en-
tered, action was still pending between parties. 
Yusky v. Chief Consol. Mining Co., 65 Utah 
269, 236 P. 452 (1925). 
Notice to parties. 
Under this rule, a judgment is complete and 
is deemed entered for all purposes when it is 
signed and filed, and not when notice is re-
ceived by the parties. In re Bundy's Estate, 121 
Utah 299, 241 P.2d 462 (1952). 
Where a losing party moved to set aside the 
judgment against her within about a month 
after learning that the judgment had been en-
tered, and her ignorance of the judgment until 
that time was due in part to a lack of notice 
that the prevailing party was required to pro-
vide pursuant to this rule, her motion was 
timely under Rule 60(b). Workman v. Nagle 
Constr., Inc., 802 P.2d 749 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). 
—Filing. 
For cases discussing necessity of serving pro-
posed findings, judgments, and orders on op-
posing counsel in compliance with former Rule 
2.9, Rules of Practice — Dist. and Cir. Ct. (now 
Rule 4-504, Rules of Judicial Administration), 
see Bigelow v. Ingersoll, 618 P.2d 50 (Utah 
1980); Wayne Garff Constr. Co. v. Richards, 
706 P.2d 1065 (Utah 1985); Calfo v. D.C. Stew-
art Co., 717 P.2d 697 (Utah 1986); Larsen v. 
Larsen, 674 P.2d 116 (Utah 1983). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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Rule 4. Appeal as of right: when taken. 
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal 
is permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the 
notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial 
court within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed 
from. However, when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory forcible 
entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 
shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days after the date of 
entry of the judgment or order appealed froqj^  
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion under the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) for judg-
ment under Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional 
findings of fact, whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be re-
quired if the motion is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the 
judgment; or (4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all 
parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting 
or denying any other such motion. Similarly, if a timely motion under the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) 
under Rule 24 for a new trial; or (2) under Rule 26 for an order, after judg-
ment, affecting the substantial rights of a defendant, the time for appeal for 
all parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or grant-
ing or denying any other such motion. A notice of appeal filed before the 
disposition of any of the above motions shall have no effect. A new notice of 
appeal must be filed within the prescribed time measured from the entry of 
the order of the trial court disposing of the motion as provided above. 
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order* Except as provided in 
paragraph (b) of this rule, a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a 
decision, judgment, or order but before the entry of the judgment or order of 
the trial court shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof. 
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a 
party, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date 
on which the first notice of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise 
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule, whichever period last expires. 
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing of excus-
able neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal 
upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration. of the time 
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule. A motion filed before expiration of the 
prescribed time may be ex parte unless the trial court otherwise requires. 
Notice of a motion filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be given 
to the other parties in accordance with the rules of practice of the trial court. 
No extension shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time or 10 days from the 
date of entry of the order granting the motion, whichever occurs later. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Final order or judgment. 
Post-judgment motions. 
Attorney fees. Premature notice. 
Cross-appeal- Reconsideration of order. 
Extension of time to appeal. Timeliness of notice. 
Filing of notice. —Date of notice. 
Filing with county clerk. Cited. 
438 
Tab 17 
Rule 5 UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
not confer jurisdiction on the court. Anderson 
v. Schwendiman, 764 P.2d 999 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). 
Reconsideration of order. 
The Court of Appeals declined to reconsider 
and overrule its prior denial of the state's re-
quest to dismiss an appeal as untimely. State 
v. Yates, 765 P.2d 251 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Timeliness of notice. 
Notice of appeal filed within the required pe-
riod from date of entry of order of contempt was 
filed timely and Supreme Court had jurisdic-
tion to hear appeal concerning the contempt 
order. Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320 (Utah 
1982). 
An untimely motion for a new trial had no 
effect on the running of the time for filing a 
notice of appeal. Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 
1320 (Utah 1982). 
Case was temporarily remanded to the juve-
nile court in order to allow that court to make 
a determination whether an order extending 
the time for appeal should be entered by the 
juvenile court under this rule, when it was not 
apparent whether the notice of appeal was ei-
ther timely filed or deemed timely filed by the 
juvenile court. State In re M.S., 781 P.2d 1287 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Where plaintiff, one day after the voluntary 
withdrawal of its motion for directed verdict, 
filed a notice of appeal and also moved for an 
extension of time in which to file a notice of 
appeal, the notice of appeal was timely filed, 
irrespective of whether the order granting ad-
ditional time for filing had a nunc pro lu** 
effect. Guardian State Bank v. Stangl T*i 
P.2d 1 (Utah 1989). 
Notice of appeal placed in the prison ma;! b> 
an incarcerated criminal defendant within t>* 
30-day period set forth in this rule wan rwt 
timely, where the notice was filed in the di* 
trict court more than 30 days after entry of Uw 
judgment being appealed. State v. Palmer. 7?* 
P.2d 521 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
By using the disjunctive "or," Subdivision c 
clearly allows the notice of appeal to be filnd 
after the announcement of either a decision. • 
judgment, or an order. "Decision" is broadlj 
defined to cover final judgments, interlocutor? 
orders, or "the first step leading to a judf 
ment," and includes a trial court's determina 
tion of guilt. City of St. George v. Smith. 814 
P.2d 1154 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Appellant'6 notice of appeal, which was ft lid 
after the announcement of the decision of gmh 
but before sentencing, was timely filed undr? 
Subdivision (c). City of St. George v. Smit*> 
814 P.2d 1154 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
—Date of notice. 
In determining whether a notice of appeal n 
timely filed and establishes jurisdiction in an 
appellate court, the appellate court is bound b> 
the filing date on the notice of appeal transmit 
ted to it by the trial court. State In re M.S., 761 
P.2d 1287 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Cited in Neerings v. Utah State Bar, 166 
Utah Adv. Rep. 13 (1991). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — When will premature notice of ap-
peal be retroactively validated in federal civil 
case, 76 A.L.R. Fed. 199. 
Rule 5, Discretionary appeals from interlocutory orders. 
(a) Petition for permission to appeal. An appeal from an interlocutor) 
order may be sought by any party by filing a petition for permission to app*a 
from the interlocutory order with the clerk of the appellate court with jurisdic-
tion over the case within 20 days after the entry of the order of the trial court. 
with proof of service on all other parties to the action. r 
(b) Fees and copies of petition. The petitioner shall file with the Clerk o 
the Supreme Court an original and seven copies of the petition, or, with tn* 
Clerk of the Court of Appeals, an original and four copies, together with tn* 
fee for filing a notice of appeal in the trial court and the docketing fee in tne 
appellate court. If an order is issued authorizing the appeal, the clerk of tn* 
appellate court shall immediately give notice of the order by mail to tn 
respective parties and shall transmit a certified copy of the order, togetne 
with a copy of the petition and filing fee, to the trial court where the P ^ V ^ J 
and order shall be filed in lieu of a notice of appeal. If the petition is denied 
the filing fee shall be refunded. 
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(c) Content of petition. The petition shall contain: 
(1) A statement of the facts necessary to an understanding of the con-
trolling question of law determined by the order sought to be reviewed; 
(2) A statement of the question of law and a demonstration that the 
question was properly raised before the trial court and ruled upon; 
(3) A statement of the reasons why an immediate interlocutory appeal 
should be permitted; and 
(4) A statement of the reason why the appeal may materially advance 
the termination of the litigation. 
(5) The petition shall include a copy of the order of the trial court from 
which an appeal is sought and any related findings of fact, conclusions of 
law and opinion. 
(d) Answer. Within 10 days after service of the petition, any other party 
may file an answer in opposition or concurrence. An original and seven copies 
of the answer shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original and four copies 
shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. The petition and any answer shall be 
submitted without oral argument unless otherwise ordered. 
(e) Grant of permission. An appeal from an interlocutory order may be 
granted only if it appears that the order involves substantial rights and may 
materially affect the final decision or that a determination of the correctness 
of the order before final judgment will better serve the administration and 
interests of justice. The order permitting the appeal may set forth the particu-
lar issue or point of law which will be considered and may be on such terms, 
including the filing of a bond for costs and damages, as the appellate court 
may determine. If the petition is granted, the appeal shall be deemed to have 
been docketed by the granting of the petition, and all proceedings subsequent 
to the granting of the petition shall be as, and within the time required, for 
appeals from final judgments. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS way from defendant's truck, preliminary order 
by the trial court that unlawful loading of the 
Challenge to sufficiency of evidence.
 t r u c k w a s negligence as a matter of law and 
Determination regarding substantial rights. that the trial should be held only on the issue 
Irreparable damage.
 0f damages involved substantial rights of the 
New trial motion. parties and would materially affect the final 
—Arbitrary exercise of authority. decision and, therefore, was subject to an inter-
Order vacating summary judgment. mediate appeal. Klafta v. Smith, 17 Utah 2d 
Purpose in granting. $&, 404 P.2d 659 (1965). 
When to grant. 
Cited. Irreparable damage. 
. Temporary order allocating water usage by 
Challenge to sufficiency of evidence. plaintiff pending further study by court raised 
Intermediate appeal, and not writ of habeas sufficient issue of irreparable damage pending 
corpus, was only proper means to challenge
 t h e f l l i n g o f t h e f i n a l o r d e r f l x i n g a n d d e c r e e . 
sufficiency of evidence to support issuance of
 i n g t h e w a t e r r i g h t s o f t h e respective parties as 
indictment and trial court s denial of dsfen-
 to ^ appealable. In re Water Rights, 10 Utah 
dant's request for discovery of testimony of wit- 2d 77 348 P2d 679 (1960) 
nesses before grand jury. Granato v. Salt Lake 
County Grand Jury, 557 P.2d 750 (Utah 1976). New trial motion. 
Determination regarding substantial —Arbitrary exercise of authority. 
rights. If a trial court's authority with respect to a 
Where plaintiff sued for injuries suffered motion for a new trial is exercised arbitrarily, 
when her son's car, in which she was riding, the proper redress is either in a petition for 
collided with a cow which had fallen on high- interlocutory appeal, which may be granted in 
441 
